Cluster Munitions in Ukraine 2026: Usage, Military Impact & Humanitarian Analysis

What Are Cluster Munitions / DPICM?

A cluster munition is any munition that opens and releases submunitions — smaller bomblets, grenades, or mines — intended to detonate individually across a wide dispersal pattern. A single cluster shell or bomb can scatter 30–700+ submunitions over areas of 10,000–100,000 square meters.

DPICM (Dual-Purpose Improved Conventional Munition) is the US designator for its family of 155mm cluster artillery shells. "Dual-purpose" refers to each submunition's ability to penetrate light armor (via shaped-charge effect) and fragment against personnel. A standard M483A1 155mm DPICM shell contains 88 M42/M46 submunitions, each capable of penetrating ~70mm RHA. The M864 (base-bleed extended range variant) contains 72 submunitions.

The military rationale for cluster munitions is area effects: against dispersed infantry, attacking one point with high explosive and killing perhaps 1–3 soldiers, versus scattering 88 submunitions across a 200×150m area — capable of simultaneously affecting an entire company-size unit in the open or in shallow trenches.

Russian Cluster Munition Use

Russia has used cluster munitions against Ukrainian military and civilian targets throughout the conflict. Documented systems include:

• RBK-500 cluster bomb: Air-delivered, containing PTAB, SHOAB, or AO series submunitions. Used extensively in attacks on Ukrainian cities including Kharkiv, Mykolaiv, and Zaporizhzhia.
• 9M27K MLRS rocket: Cluster-warhead variant for BM-27 Uragan multiple-launch rocket system, containing 30 9N210/9N235 submunitions.
• 3-O-8 cargo artillery shell: 152mm cluster shells for Russian artillery, containing anti-tank bomblets.
• OTR-21 Tochka cluster warhead: Early-war use over Mariupol area (Feb 2022).

Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, and the UN have documented extensive Russian cluster munition use against civilian areas — attacks on markets, residential areas, and medical facilities represent prohibited use under international humanitarian law regardless of treaty status.

US Transfer Decision 2023

The Biden administration announced in July 2023 that it would transfer 155mm DPICM cluster shells to Ukraine. The decision was described as a response to critical Ukrainian artillery ammunition shortages during the 2023 counteroffensive — DPICM was available from large US Cold War stockpiles when conventional 155mm shells were in short supply.

Key conditions the US attached to the transfer:

• Ukraine pledged to use DPICM only against military targets in areas without significant civilian presence
• Ukraine committed to provide the US data on where DPICM is used
• Ukraine committed to conduct post-conflict demining of affected areas
• Preference given to lower-dud-rate variants (M864 with self-destruct fuzes) over older M483A1

The decision was controversial among US allies — particularly those that are Convention on Cluster Munitions signatories (Germany, UK, France, Canada) who are legally prohibited from facilitating transfer of cluster munitions.

Ukraine's Use of DPICM

Ukraine has used US-supplied DPICM primarily in two contexts:

1. Russian trench and fortification suppression: Russian defensive lines — the "Surovikin line" and related fortifications — consist of extensive trench networks housing infantry. DPICM's wide dispersal pattern can suppress an entire trench section simultaneously, creating conditions for infantry advance that standard point-detonating HE cannot replicate at the same shell-per-effect ratio.
2. Russian artillery battery suppression: Counter-battery fire with DPICM against Russian gun positions. The wide submunition dispersal can disable multiple guns and crew simultaneously even without a direct hit on each piece.

Ukraine has generally avoided confirmed use in areas with significant civilian populations. Most reported uses have been in the Zaporizhzhia, Donetsk, and Kherson oblasts in zones depopulated through prior Russian occupation and combat operations.

Military Effectiveness Analysis

Ukrainian commanders and US/NATO observers have reported generally positive assessments of DPICM effectiveness for specific missions:

• Trench suppression: Reports of 2–5× higher suppression effect against trench lines compared to equivalent rounds of standard 155mm HE. One submunition in or near a trench section creates kill/injury probability similar to a direct HE shell hit in terms of area coverage.
• Russian infantry attrition: DPICM use correlates with higher Russian infantry casualty events in documented engagements where observation confirmed Russian formations in the open.
• Ammunition conservation: Achieving equivalent effects with fewer rounds is critical when Ukraine faces a persistent artillery ammunition shortage. DPICM's multiplier effect conserves rounds for other fire missions.
• Limitations: DPICM is ineffective against hardened concrete bunkers (needs direct HE or specialized penetrating rounds), heavy armor (needs proper APFSDS or HEAT), and is degraded by heavy vegetation canopy (submunitions can arm prematurely).

Cluster Munition Types Comparison

Humanitarian Concerns and Dud Rates

The humanitarian concern with cluster munitions centers on unexploded submunitions — "duds" that fail to detonate on impact and remain as de-facto landmines, explosive hazards that can kill civilians years or decades after conflict ends. This is the documented pattern in Laos, Cambodia, Lebanon, and other post-conflict regions.

Ukraine is already the world's most heavily mined country — both Russia and Ukraine have laid extensive minefields throughout the conflict. DPICM dud submunitions add another layer of post-conflict contamination risk, particularly in agricultural land vital for Ukraine's economic recovery.

Ukraine's commitments and mitigating factors:

• Ukraine prefers M864 with self-destruct fuzes (theoretical dud rate under 1%) over older M483A1
• Ukraine maintains targeting records to support post-conflict demining
• Ukraine's demining capacity is being built with international support (EU, HALO Trust, US training programs)
• Most DPICM use has been in areas already substantially contaminated with anti-personnel mines from both sides

Critics argue that even 1% dud rates across millions of submunitions produce an enormous number of post-conflict hazards. Defenders of Ukraine's DPICM use argue that the alternative — losing the war or accepting higher Ukrainian casualties through weapons shortage — creates worse humanitarian outcomes.

Legal and Treaty Context

The Convention on Cluster Munitions (CCM, 2008) prohibits member states from using, producing, transferring, or stockpiling cluster munitions. As of 2026, 111 states are parties to the CCM.

Critically, neither the United States, Russia, Ukraine, China, India, nor several other major military powers are parties to the CCM. The CCM therefore does not legally prohibit Ukraine or the US from using or transferring DPICM. Russia's cluster munition use against civilian areas may still constitute violations of prohibitions on indiscriminate attacks under general international humanitarian law (applicable to all parties), even absent CCM membership.

NATO members that are CCM signatories (Germany, UK, France, Netherlands, Canada) face legal constraints on facilitating cluster munition transfers — this created some diplomatic complications in how US DPICM reached Ukraine through the supply chain without passing through CCM-signatory territory.

2026 Status

As of early 2026, Ukraine continues to use US-supplied DPICM as part of its artillery mix. The focus remains on trench suppression and counter-battery missions. Ukraine's overall artillery ammunition situation has improved from 2023 crisis levels as EU and US production has scaled — but DPICM remains a valuable force-multiplier in the inventory.

Post-war humanitarian planning is already underway: the International Mine Action Standards (IMAS) organization, HALO Trust, Norwegian People's Aid, and Ukrainian state authorities have begun mapping contaminated zones using DPICM usage data Ukraine has shared with international partners, enabling future demining planning.