Strategic Logic of Deep Strikes

Ukraine's deep strike campaign rests on several strategic pillars:

• Asymmetric cost imposition: Russia can bomb Ukrainian cities every night with little strategic accountability. Ukraine striking inside Russia forces the Russian government to spend resources on homeland air defense, imposes economic costs, and demonstrates to Russian civilians that the war has consequences for Russia — not just for Ukrainians.
• Degrade logistics: Fuel depots, ammunition storage, and railway junctions inside Russia support Russian frontline operations. Destroying these extends supply chains, forces redundancy investment, and reduces Russian operational tempo.
• Force air asset withdrawal: Su-34 and Su-35 aircraft launching glide bombs are Ukraine's most-wanted targets. By striking airfields inside Russia, Ukraine forces Russia to move aircraft further from the front or protect them more expensively — increasing the cost per glide bomb dropped on Ukraine.
• Home front pressure: Demonstrating to Moscow residents, Russian elites, and the Russian political class that the war has costs that reach them — not just Ukrainian soldiers on the front — potentially influences Russian decision-making over time.

Ukraine's One-Way Drone Campaign

The core of Ukraine's deep strike capability is its domestically produced long-range one-way attack (OWA) drone fleet. These drones:

• Have ranges of 1,000–2,000+ km depending on variant
• Are relatively cheap to produce — cost estimated at $35,000–$100,000 per drone depending on specification
• Fly at low altitude using terrain masking to evade radar detection
• Use pre-programmed waypoints or inertial navigation (GPS-denied variants)
• Carry warheads sufficient to start fires at fuel facilities or damage aircraft in the open

Ukrainian drone production scaled dramatically through 2024, with the government announcing a target of 1 million drones annually (various types). Long-range OWA drones are the most strategically valuable component of this production effort.

Related: Ukraine Drone Industry 2026

Oil Refinery Strikes: The Fuel Campaign

Beginning in late 2023 and escalating massively through 2024, Ukraine conducted a sustained campaign against Russian oil refineries. Key strikes:

• Ryazan refinery — one of Russia's largest, struck multiple times in 2024
• Saratov refinery — struck in 2024
• Nizhniy Novgorod (Lukoil) — struck 2024
• Slavyansk-on-Kuban (Krasnodar) — multiple strikes
• Tuapse refinery — struck multiple times
• Numerous other fuel depot and oil processing facilities across western Russia

Ukrainian drone attacks on Russian refineries were calculated to have reduced Russian refinery capacity by a meaningful percentage by mid-2024, contributing to reported Russian fuel shortages for agricultural and logistics use (though the military fuel supply was prioritized and affected less directly).

The refinery campaign demonstrated that Ukraine could strike targets 1,500+ km from the front line — far into Russia's European territory, including within range of Moscow.

ATACMS and Long-Range Missile Use

ATACMS (Army Tactical Missile System) has a range of approximately 300 km and carries a cluster or unitary warhead. Ukraine received ATACMS — initially covertly — from the US in 2023, and the authorization for their use was gradually expanded through 2024.

Notable ATACMS targets:

• Saky airfield, Crimea: ATACMS strikes damaged or destroyed aircraft and infrastructure at this key Russian air base
• Belbek airfield, Crimea: Russian aircraft at multiple Crimean bases struck by ATACMS
• Logistics depots in occupied territory and across the Russian border: Supply dumps near the front used by Russian forces were struck
• Command posts: Several Russian command and communications facilities were targeted
• Kursk Oblast military facilities: After the Biden administration authorized ATACMS use inside Russia proper (November 2024, targeting of forces in Russian territory used to attack Ukraine), strikes on Russian military concentrations in Kursk/Bryansk regions

ATACMS authorization evolution was a major diplomatic story through 2024, with Ukraine requesting unrestricted use from the start, Biden administration expanding authorization in stages, and the Trump administration freezing the permissive posture in early 2025.

Storm Shadow / SCALP Cruise Missiles

Storm Shadow (UK-supplied) and SCALP-EG (France-supplied) are air-launched cruise missiles with ~250 km range, stealth characteristics, and precision warheads designed for bunker-busting. They became Ukraine's most capable precision strike weapons for fixed targets.

Key uses:

• Russian military headquarters in occupied territory
• Ammunition depots
• Sevastopol naval infrastructure (Crimea); including Black Sea Fleet HQ strike
• Bridge approaches and logistics nodes

Britain gradually expanded authorization for Storm Shadow use — first limited to occupied Ukrainian territory, then Crimea, then (in 2024) limited Russian territory from which attacks against Ukraine originate. This gradual expansion exemplified the pattern of Western states incrementally relaxing restrictions as the war continued.

Strikes on Moscow and Russian Cities

Multiple Ukrainian one-way drone attacks reached Moscow and the Moscow region through 2023 and 2024:

• May 2023: Drones reached Moscow — a psychologically significant milestone demonstrating that the war could reach the Russian capital
• Multiple subsequent attacks struck Moscow Oblast targets, including reportedly near the Kremlin
• St. Petersburg area was also reached by Ukrainian drones
• Multiple Russian cities and industrial areas struck with varying success rates (Russia claimed high interception rates, but damage to individual facilities was confirmed by satellite imagery)

The Moscow strikes were primarily psychological — the warheads were small and military damage limited. But the message was significant: Putin had told the Russian population the war was far away; Ukraine was bringing it to their doorstep.

Kerch Bridge Attacks

The Kerch Bridge (Crimean Bridge) connecting mainland Russia to the Crimean peninsula has been one of Ukraine's most strategically important targets:

• October 2022 truck bomb: A massive explosion on the bridge — attributed to Ukrainian intelligence — caused significant structural damage and a fire on the fuel train
• July 2023 naval drone attack: Ukrainian surface drones (USVs) attacked the bridge, causing damage to one of the road spans
• Multiple subsequent attack attempts: Ukraine used various methods to interdict or damage the bridge as a Russian logistics artery to Crimea

The Kerch Bridge was critical for supplying Russian forces in Crimea and for the Russian military's self-image of permanent Crimean control. Persistent Ukrainian attacks constrained its use and imposed expensive repair costs.

Related: Ukraine Naval Drone Campaign

Western Weapons Restrictions on Deep Strikes

The political story of Ukraine's deep strike campaign is inseparable from the Western restrictions that limited it:

• ATACMS restrictions: The US provided ATACMS covertly in 2023 with restrictions on use deep inside Russian territory. Authorization was gradually expanded — to airfields in Crimea, then to military targets in Russian territory used to attack Ukraine — but never provided fully unlimited authorization. The Biden administration's late 2024 expansion was significant; Trump's early 2025 reversal was significant in the opposite direction.
• Storm Shadow/SCALP restrictions: UK/France imposed geographic restrictions that were gradually relaxed. The restriction logic: Western governments feared that Ukraine striking deep inside Russia with Western weapons would trigger Russian escalation (nuclear threats, direct NATO-Russia conflict).
• F-16 restrictions: Even when Ukraine received F-16s, initial use restrictions limited their employment from Ukrainian territory and their weapons loads.
• Taurus (Germany): Never delivered to Ukraine during the Scholz government despite Ukrainian requests, largely due to escalation concerns specifically related to its range allowing strikes deep into Russia.

The restrictions were a central frustration for Ukrainian military planners who argued they could strike deeper logistics and airfields that would significantly reduce Russian strike capacity — but were barred from doing so by Western political caution.

Russian Response to Deep Strikes

Russia responded to Ukraine's deep strike campaign in several ways:

• Expanded air defense: Russia deployed additional air defense systems around Moscow and other major cities, airfields, and oil refineries. This consumed air defense resources that might otherwise have been at the front.
• Aircraft relocation: Russian aircraft were moved to more distant airfields to reduce exposure to Ukrainian long-range strikes — increasing flight time per sortie and reducing mission rates.
• Retaliatory escalation: Russia responded to each major Ukrainian strike campaign with intensified attacks on Ukrainian cities, infrastructure, and energy systems.
• Reinforced critical infrastructure: Russian oil and energy facilities were given additional protective measures, though the dispersed and flammable nature of refinery infrastructure makes full protection difficult.

Effectiveness Assessment

Ukraine's deep strike campaign achieved meaningful but incomplete results:

Successes

• Destroyed or significantly damaged multiple Russian oil refineries, reducing processing capacity
• Forced Russian aircraft to move further from the front, modestly reducing strike sorties
• Forced expensive air defense upgrades and diversions of Russian military resources to homeland protection
• Demonstrated to Russian domestic population that the war had costs reaching Russian territory
• Struck Sevastopol Black Sea Fleet infrastructure, contributing to constraining Russian naval operations

Limitations

• Russia's oil production and export continued at high levels despite refinery damage — export rather than refining was the primary revenue driver
• Russia adapted — moving assets, adding defense, rebuilding damaged facilities
• Western restrictions prevented the most strategically valuable targets (deepest logistics, aircraft production) from being struck regularly
• The strategic effect on Russia's war-making capacity was real but did not fundamentally alter the military balance on the front

The campaign is best understood as one element of a comprehensive effort to impose costs on Russia — not a war-winning strategy in itself, but a meaningful dimension of sustained strategic pressure.

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