Ukraine Mobile Fire Groups 2026: HIMARS, Caesar, M109 and Combined-Arms Shoot-and-Scoot Doctrine

Origins: Why Mobile Fire Group Doctrine Emerged in 2022

Ukraine's pre-2022 artillery doctrine and force posture reflected Soviet heritage — massed fires from battery positions, coordinated at divisional and army level, with static fire planning conducted over hours or days. The first weeks of full-scale war shattered this approach:

• Russian counter-battery capability: Russia deployed Zoopark-1 and Zoopark-1M (1L219/1L259) artillery locating radars alongside AN/TPQ-36/37 equivalents, capable of detecting and back-plotting the trajectory of artillery rounds within 15–30 seconds of firing — providing a six-digit grid of the firing position. Once this coordinate was in the Russian fire control system, Russian artillery or rocket artillery could have rounds on the way within 2–5 minutes. Static battery positions — which Soviet doctrine assumed could be defended and which required 20–30 minutes to displace — became death traps during this window.
• Early war losses to counter-battery fire: Ukraine suffered significant artillery losses in the first 2–3 months of the war to Russian counter-battery fire on identified static positions. Soviet-era 2S1 and 2S3 batteries in fixed positions were systematically located and destroyed — each loss both reducing artillery capacity and consuming trained crew. The lessons were learned in blood and driven home rapidly by the scale of materiel attrition.
• Adaptation drivers: Three simultaneous factors accelerated Ukrainian adaptation: (a) arrival of Western self-propelled wheeled artillery (Caesar in June 2022, M109A3 slightly earlier) with faster displacement speeds than tracked Soviet SPH; (b) NATO training advisors strongly advocating MFG dispersal doctrine from direct NATO conventional doctrine (which had already adopted MFG principles for European high-intensity scenarios); (c) Ukraine's own innovative lower-level commanders independently arriving at dispersion solutions without top-down direction, which command structures then formalised.

Mobile Fire Group Structure

By 2025–2026, Ukraine's standardised MFG structure has settled into consistent patterns across different artillery types:

• Core fire element: 1–2 self-propelled howitzers (Caesar, M109, 2S3, Pion) or 1 HIMARS/M270 launcher. The core element must be capable of independently executing a fire mission without requiring external support during the firing sequence — limiting factors (ammunition, communications, fire control) must all be organic to the group.
• Fire control: Each MFG carries its own digital fire control capable of computing firing data from a target grid. Caesar groups use ATLAS; HIMARS units use AFATDS; legacy SPH units use laptop-based Ukrainian C2 software. The fire control operator is typically in the command vehicle (a separate truck) rather than the howitzer cab, allowing the howitzer to move independently during displacement while the command vehicle repositions separately.
• Communications: Each MFG maintains encrypted radio communications (Harris FALCON III or equivalent) to the fire control element at brigade level. Target grids are received digitally when the higher-headquarters AFATDS/Delta system is available, or by voice when it is not. Communications security (frequency changes, minimal on-air time) is a specific survivability measure — Russian direction-finding equipment can locate radio sources, making regular frequency changes mandatory.
• Organic reconnaissance: By 2024–2026, most MFGs operate with an attached small drone element — 1–3 operators with Mavic 3 or equivalent commercial reconnaissance drones plus sometimes an FPV craft for close-in target engagement. This organic observation capability makes the MFG self-supporting for target acquisition — it does not need to wait for a centralised reconnaissance asset to feed it targets.
• SHORAD attachment: For HIMARS and high-value Caesar groups, a Gepard ZSU or MANPADS team is often co-located or nearby, providing short-range air defense against Russian reconnaissance drones attempting to locate the group. The air defense element moves with the MFG when it displaces.

Artillery Systems by MFG Role Table

Shoot-and-Scoot Mechanics

The shoot-and-scoot tactical cycle is the operational core of mobile fire group doctrine:

• Position selection — pre-planned network: Ukraine's MFG doctrine does not permit ad-hoc position selection en route to a fire mission. Positions are pre-planned by engineer or staff reconnaissance: the position provides adequate line of fire to the target sector, has a hard-surface or firm-ground approach for rapid exit regardless of weather, has approach routes from multiple directions to prevent pattern recognition by Russian surveillance, and is distant enough from other frequently-used positions that Russian fire cannot bracket multiple positions in one shoot.
• Occupation sequence: The howitzer arrives at the pre-planned position by the directional approach route. Set-up time for Caesar on a pre-planned position: approximately 30–45 seconds from stop to first round (the digital fire control auto-computes firing data from GPS position and pre-loaded target data). HIMARS: approximately 60–90 seconds stop-to-fire. During set-up, the SHORAD and drone observation elements take their positions flanking the howitzer.
• Fire mission execution: Ukraine MFG doctrine limits the standard fire mission to 2–6 rounds (sufficient to achieve effect with drone observing and adjusting) conducted within 60–90 seconds. After the final round, the howitzer begins displacement immediately — there is no "wait for adjustment" after mission completion; the drone operator reports results after the howitzer has already left.
• Displacement route: The exit route from the position is a different route from the arrival route — never retrace approach. Displacement road march to a holding area 5–15 km from the firing position, where the group waits for the next fire mission assignment from higher control. The holding area is also pre-planned and changed after each use.
• Position sanitisation: After displacement, no equipment, ammunition cases, or other identifiable material is left at the firing position — Russian reconnaissance drones conducting Battle Damage Assessment after a counter-battery strike can identify firing-position indicators (brass cases, compressed earth, tread marks) that refine future targeting predictions about pattern of life.

Drone Integration with Mobile Fire Groups

The organic drone element has transformed MFG fire effectiveness since becoming standard practice in 2023–2024:

• Target handoff to MFG: When a reconnaissance drone spots a target (Russian vehicle, artillery position, troop concentration), the drone operator's exact grid (from GPS positional data in the drone's telemetry) is transmitted directly to the MFG's fire control system via encrypted digital message — the fire control software auto-computes firing data from that grid before the MFG has even reached its firing position, enabling the howitzer to be ready to fire within seconds of stopping.
• Round adjustment protocol: Drone observer calls first round adjustment by estimating ranging error (over/short) and deflection error in metres, transmitted to MFG fire control. Second round correction is applied; typically achieving close-enough effect on rounds 2–3 to confirm target hit. The entire adjustment sequence occurs while the howitzer may have fired and already be displacing — the observer's adjustment for round 3 may arrive as the howitzer is already moving.
• Russian drone protection: The counter-problem — Russian reconnaissance drones (Orlan-10, ZALA, Supercam) performing the same function in reverse, observing the MFG for Russian counter-battery. Ukraine's SHORAD attachment (Gepard, Stinger MANPADS, anti-drone rifles) attempts to deny Russian drones the observation opportunity. Certain MFG sectors where Russian drone coverage is persistent may limit mission execution to night operations or periods of weather-reduced drone activity.
• FPV attack integration: By 2025–2026, some Ukrainian MFGs have added organic FPV attack drones — enabling the group to conduct FPV drone strikes against soft targets (supply trucks, AFVs) when they are located by the reconnaissance drone, without waiting for artillery allocation. This creates a true combined-arms group (artillery + reconnaissance + FPV strike) capable of independent fire support operations over a sector.

Counter-Battery Threat and Survivability

The Russian counter-battery system is Ukraine's MFG planners' central tactical problem:

• Zoopark-1M capability: The 1L259 Zoopark-1M radar can locate rocket and artillery fire simultaneously for multiple sources, processing tracks and computing firing positions within 15–30 seconds. Its coverage arc and range allow it to monitor a substantial battle sector from a single location. Detection probability depends on trajectory — flat-trajectory rounds are harder to detect post-burst; high-angle howitzer fire makes a longer trajectory that is easier to back-plot. Ukraine's fire planning sometimes specifies charge selection to alter trajectory angle and complicate back-plot geometry.
• Counter-survival measures: Ukraine's doctrine includes active countermeasures: (a) deliberate use of decoy positions (parking a vehicle in a known radar observation area for a period, simulating an occupied firing position to attract counter-battery fire at an empty location); (b) multi-direction simultaneous firing (two Caesar groups fire within seconds of each other from positions in different directions — the radar must process two simultaneous tracks, potentially reducing processing speed or causing false back-plot averaging); (c) maximum-range missions where possible, keeping the firing position as far from the front line radar as capable — Zoopark detection probability decreases with range.
• Survivability data: Published assessments suggest Ukraine's MFG doctrine reduced per-battery counter-battery losses by an estimated 70% compared to 2022 static position losses — a rough figure that reflects the improved attrition rate in 2023–2025 despite continued massive Russian counter-battery effort. This is not "immune" — Russian strikes still claim MFG assets, particularly when groups are slow to displace or when Russian drone observation (rather than radar alone) directly locates the firing position.

Command and Control Architecture

Ukraine's C2 for MFG operations spans multiple software systems developed or adopted over 2022–2026:

• Delta platform: Ukraine's Delta situational awareness system (developed by the Ministry of Defence's digital transformation initiative) provides a common operating picture across all Ukrainian armed forces elements — including targeting data from UAV operators, intelligence reports, and friendly force positions. MFG fire control elements receive targeting grids from the Delta picture when they are within its network coverage, enabling near-real-time target-to-fire assignment flow from frontline observation to MFG fire control.
• AFATDS integration: US-origin AFATDS (Advanced Field Artillery Tactical Data System) was delivered with HIMARS and some M109 systems. AFATDS manages fire mission scheduling, deconfliction (preventing multiple units firing at the same target simultaneously or firing at each other's assets), and artillery safety zones. Ukraine has worked extensively to link Delta's UAV-derived targeting data into AFATDS for friction-reduced fire mission flow.
• ATLAS (Caesar): France's ATLAS fire control system is organic to Caesar self-propelled howitzer deliveries. ATLAS is a separate system from AFATDS, requiring data bridge protocols between Caesar-equipped MFGs and HIMARS/M109-equipped groups. Ukraine has invested in developing these bridges but coordination overhead between system types remains higher than within-type coordination.
• Radio discipline: Ukraine's MFG communications protocols specify strict radio emission minimisation — brief transmission windows for target receipt and fire mission reporting, extended periods of radio silence. Russian direction-finding capability can locate transmission sources within minutes of prolonged emission. MFG command vehicles are trained to transmit in minimal-duration bursts, accept satellite-sourced target data downloads that require no transmission, and use courier-type relay vehicles for non-urgent coordination rather than radio.

Survivability Comparison: Static Battery vs MFG

Pre-Planned Position Networks

The pre-planned position network is the logistical foundation that makes MFG shoot-and-scoot operationally feasible:

• Position survey requirement: Each firing position in the network requires a survey — GPS-accurate positioning of the firing point (accurate to 5 metres or better for direct fire control input), survey of the approach and exit routes for road surface condition and bridge weight limits (Caesar weighs 17.7 tonnes — some rural bridges cannot support it), and camouflage assessment (is the position masked from likely Russian drone observation angles?).
• Network density: A well-resourced MFG operating area should have 8–15 pre-planned positions per howitzer, distributed to cover all likely target sectors and avoid clustering. In practice, Ukraine's engineer capacity and position evaluation time has sometimes limited networks to 4–6 positions per gun, accepted as a degraded but workable compromise.
• Position renewal cycle: After a position is used, it enters a "cooldown" period and is not reused for 48–96 hours — Russian pattern analysis of firing position usage can correlate trajectory data across multiple missions to predict future position occupation if intervals and locations are not varied. Used positions that leave visible evidence (tread marks, disturbed earth) may be retired from the network permanently if Russian reconnaissance drone coverage of the area is sufficient to note indicators.
• All-weather access priority: Ukrainian experience from wet autumn and thaw periods (the most challenging ground conditions) showed that positions accessed via unpaved tracks could become unusable when the track became impassable for a 17-tonne wheeled vehicle. Hard-surface access routes (concrete, asphalt, compacted aggregate) are prioritised in position selection — even if this reduces the number of available positions in some sectors.

HIMARS as the MFG Gold Standard

HIMARS M142 is operationally considered Ukraine's best-optimised MFG platform for several reinforcing reasons:

• Speed and platform design: The HIMARS wheeled chassis (FMTV 5-tonne truck family) achieves road speeds of 85 km/h. The launcher pod is pre-loaded with the 6-rocket GMLRS pod or 1 ATACMS missile — no separate loading cycle is required at the firing position. Firing from stop to launch takes approximately 90 seconds for the crew; the truck can physically move within 30 seconds of last round since the launcher requires only pod retract and cab preparation.
• Range standoff: GMLRS range of approximately 70 km (GMLRS-ER up to 150 km) means HIMARS firing positions are typically 35–60 km behind the line of contact. At this distance from the front, Russian counter-battery radars face their most marginal acquisition geometry — the trajectory back-plot over 40+ km of flight has significantly larger angular uncertainty, reducing grid accuracy of the counter-battery fix to perhaps 100–300 metres vs 50–100 metres at closer range. This inherently increases HIMARS survivability even against detected firing positions.
• Scarcity discipline: Ukraine treats HIMARS as a scarce high-value asset and applies strict fire mission prioritisation — HIMARS missions are reserved for high-value targets (ammunition depots, command posts, air defense systems, bridge chokepoints) that justify the expensive GMLRS round (~$160,000 USD) and the risk of revealing a launcher position. This mission discipline (not expending HIMARS on target categories Caesar can service) is itself an MFG doctrine element, preserving HIMARS availability for its highest-value applications.

Caesar's Role in MFG Operations

Caesar has proven the most versatile and operationally valued MFG howitzer platform:

• Speed advantage over tracked competitors: Caesar's 155mm gun on a Renault Sherpa 10 or Tatra 8×8 chassis achieves 80 km/h road speeds — comparable to HIMARS and dramatically faster than M109 Paladin's 56 km/h or 2S3's 60 km/h. This speed advantage directly translates to post-fire survivability in the race against Russian counter-battery response time.
• 60-second position establishment: Caesar's direct loading system (rounds accessible from the cab area), autoloader (option on newer Mark II), and GPS-aided ATLAS fire control mean time from vehicle stop to first round is approximately 45–60 seconds on a pre-planned position. This is the fastest of any howitzer system in Ukraine's inventory and enables a narrower firing-position occupation window than any tracked competitor.
• Operational availability: Caesar's commercial truck chassis components are widely sourced — maintenance is significantly more tractable in Ukraine than for complex tracked military hulls. Operational availability rates for Caesar in Ukrainian service are reported as high relative to tracked systems, contributing disproportionately to available fire group hours per month despite not being the most numerous 155mm system in Ukraine's inventory.
• Mark II upgrade: France has begun delivering Caesar Mark II (8×8 configuration, autoloader, increased ammo stowage) to Ukraine — providing further improvement in rate of fire (6 rpm vs 3–4 rpm for Mark I with manual loading) and reducing crew size demands. The improved rate of fire matters for MFG missions because more rounds can be placed on target within the narrow 60–90 second firing window before displacement.

Air Defense Integration with Fire Groups

Co-locating SHORAD capability with fire groups became standard practice after Russian adaptation:

• The threat evolution: Russia's initial counter-battery approach relied on radar acquisition and return fire. By 2023–2024, Russia widely deployed reconnaissance drones (Orlan-10, ZALA Lancet-3 loitering munitions) to directly spot, pursue, and attack MFG elements — sometimes following a HIMARS or Caesar from its firing position to its dispersal hold area and calling in Lancet or tube artillery once the vehicle was stationary. This drone-following threat demanded organic SHORAD protection travelling with the MFG.
• Gepard layered protection: Germany's Gepard 35mm air defense vehicle is sometimes assigned to cover HIMARS groups — the Gepard's twin 35mm guns are highly effective against Orlan and similar drones and can engage at sufficient range to prevent an Orlan from achieving the accurate position report that enables a follow-on Lancet strike. Gepard moves with the MFG on displacement, maintaining coverage during the most vulnerable transit phase.
• MANPADS teams: Less resource-intensive than Gepard, MANPADS teams (Stinger, Mistral, Piorun) assigned to MFG groups provide mobile SHORAD that rides in a standard truck with the MFG and deploys at holding areas and firing positions. Effective against Orlan-10 at its operating altitude (500–1,500m) though with the inherent all-weather limitation of IR-guided MANPADS.
• Electronic jamming: Vehicle-mounted drone jamming systems (electronic warfare units disrupting video link and GPS on following drones) are increasingly standard in higher-priority MFG groups — particularly around HIMARS. These systems create a local jamming bubble of 1–3 km radius that denies drone operators reliable video from their aircraft, degrading position reporting accuracy even if the drone remains physically present.

NATO's Lessons Drawn from Ukraine MFG Practice

Ukraine's MFG doctrine has substantially influenced NATO members' own artillery doctrine development:

• Pre-war doctrine validation: NATO's own pre-2022 conventional warfare doctrine already included dispersed artillery operations as a concept, but many members had not exercised it at realistic scale or high tempo. Ukraine's war validated the doctrine's effectiveness under actual high-intensity fire conditions, providing empirical data on what works that no peacetime exercise generates.
• Position network pre-survey emphasis: The importance of pre-surveyed position networks was a lesson NATO members' trainers extracted early — multiple national armies who supported Ukrainian artillery training (US, UK, Germany, France) have incorporated "pre-planned position network development" as a priority field training task for their own artillery units, based on Ukraine's confirmation of its tactical necessity.
• Drone-howitzer integration as standard: Ukraine's organic drone attachment to MFGs (a bottom-up field innovation formalized into doctrine) is being adopted in modified forms by several NATO armies conducting doctrine revisions inspired by Ukraine observation. The model of a small organic drone team as an inherent element of a fire unit (rather than a separately allocated asset) is a Ukrainian-validated concept that is reshaping NATO artillery organisation planning.
• Counter-battery exchange rates: The empirical data on how MFG dispersion affects counter-battery exchange rates (ratio of rounds expended in counter-battery to results achieved) is informing force structure planning — particularly for smaller NATO members who cannot absorb losses at Soviet/Russian scale and must maximise survivability per platform.

February 2026 Status

Ukraine's mobile fire group doctrine in February 2026:

• Full institutionalisation: MFG doctrine is the standard across all Ukrainian artillery brigades — static position firing is essentially extinct in front-line practice for howitzers and rocket artillery. Training for newly mobilised artillery crews begins with MFG doctrine from day one rather than transitioning to it from static battery training.
• Equipment mix evolution: The ongoing receipt of Western wheeled systems (Caesar Mark II, additional Krab, potential future K9/K10 system) is progressively replacing legacy tracked Soviet systems at the front, further improving average MFG displacement speeds and survivability across the force.
• Russian adaptation: Russia has partially adapted — using drone observation more heavily to attempt to follow MFGs from firing position to holding area, and deploying Lancet loitering munitions that can loiter over a suspected holding area waiting for vehicle detection. Ukraine's doctrine has adapted in turn with more frequent holding area changes, vehicle camouflage nets as standard equipment, and the Gepard/jamming attachments described above.
• Deep strike coordination: The integration of ATACMS, GMLRS-ER, and Storm Shadow/SCALP enable MFG-style thinking applied to deep strike missions — single launchers conducting rapid-fire one-shot deep-strike missions against high-value targets, displacing immediately. The same shoot-and-scoot principle that protects field artillery applies to precision strike systems operating within Russian air defense range.