Electronic Warfare Systems in Ukraine: State of the Art March 2026

1. Overview: The EW Dimension

Electronic warfare has been a defining — and often under-reported — dimension of the Ukraine conflict. While drone warfare and artillery dominate headlines, the electromagnetic spectrum battle underlies nearly every tactical interaction: whether a drone reaches its target, whether artillery guidance functions, whether communications networks survive, and whether precision weapons achieve their intended effects are all partly determined by EW.

By March 2026, both Russia and Ukraine are operating sophisticated and diverse EW environments. Russia entered the war with the most doctrinally developed and numerically largest EW capability of any military; Ukraine has compensated with rapid innovation, Western assistance, and commercially-derived adaptations that have partially neutralised Russia's initial advantage.

This survey assesses the EW landscape as of early 2026 — the systems deployed, their effects, and the evolving balance.

2. Russian Strategic EW Systems

Russia's EW doctrine distinguishes strategic, operational, and tactical layers. At the strategic level:

Krasukha-2 and Krasukha-4

The Krasukha family (1L269 Krasukha-2, 1RL257 Krasukha-4) are large vehicle-mounted active jamming systems designed to suppress airborne early warning radars (Krasukha-2 targets AWACS/E-8 JSTARS at 150–300 km range) and multi-function radar systems. They have been deployed to suppress Ukrainian and NATO intelligence-gathering from across the border and to degrade Ukrainian air search capability.

Deployment in Ukraine has been confirmed by satellite imagery; several have been destroyed by Ukrainian strikes after their locations were identified through emissions analysis — a recurring pattern of EW-OSINT synergy.

Murmansk-BN

The vast Murmansk-BN HF (High Frequency, 1.5–30 MHz) direction-finding and jamming system can cover ranges of 5,000+ km. Deployed at Russian bases targeting NATO HF communications from strategic long-haul channels, it has been detected interfering with HF communications across Eastern Europe. It cannot be effectively countered by Ukraine-level capabilities.

RB-109A Bylina

Russia's AI-managed EW coordination system, Bylina reportedly automates frequency allocation across multiple EW nodes, reducing Russian operators' cognitive burden in complex electromagnetic environments. Evidence of its operational deployment in eastern Ukraine has emerged from captured documents and SIGINT reporting.

3. Russian Tactical EW Platforms

At the tactical level, Russia fields diverse platforms across the frontline:

• R-330Zh Zhitel: Satellite and cellular communications jamming at tactical distances; widely deployed, dozens confirmed in Ukraine by OSINT imagery
• Pole-21: GPS/GNSS jamming system used to deny GPS navigation to Ukrainian UAVs, guided munitions, and navigation systems; deployed in large numbers, identified as a primary threat to JDAM-ER guidance in certain sectors
• Leer-3 system: Combines Orlan-10 drone with cellular base-station spoofing payload; creates false cell towers that intercept mobile phone communications and can deliver targeted SMS messages to Ukrainian military personnel — used for psychological operations
• SPR-2 Rtut-BM: Anti-radio-fuze system that detonates enemy artillery shells prematurely by emitting signals that activate radio proximity fuzes before shells reach targets; deployed to reduce effectiveness of Ukrainian Western-standard shell fuzes
• Zhuk (Spider): Portable anti-drone jammer used at the troop level; carried by individual Russian soldiers and squad leaders

4. Russian Drone-Specific EW

Russia has extensively developed and deployed drone-specific EW through the war:

• Shipovnik-Aero: Automated RF direction-finding and jamming system targeting drone control frequencies; can identify, locate, and jam multiple drone control channels simultaneously
• Serp-VS5: Vehicle-mounted multi-directional drone jammer; covers 900 MHz–6 GHz, targeting commercial and military FPV frequencies; widely deployed at battalion level by 2025
• Tobol (satellite-comms EW): Targeting Starlink terminals used by Ukrainian drone operators; Russia has invested heavily in Starlink-band interference, reportedly reducing terminal reliability in concentrated deployment areas
• Penicillin acoustic-seismic system: While primarily artillery counterfire, Penicillin also integrates drone audio detection for early warning

Russia's drone EW capability has noticeably increased from 2023 to 2026 — FPV kill rates appear to have improved from Ukrainian reports, and Russian jamming density near the front line forces Ukrainian drone operators to increasingly use frequency-hopping and encrypted control links.

5. Ukrainian EW Development

Ukraine entered the war with strong but limited EW capability, primarily focused on tactical communications and legacy systems. Its post-invasion EW development has been remarkable:

5.1 Anklav-N

Ukrainian-developed tactical EW complex integrating direction finding, frequency analysis, and targeted communications jamming within a 60 km radius. Multiple units deployed; captures Russian R-168 AKVEDUK radio communications with high reliability.

5.2 Electronic Intelligence (ELINT) Networks

Ukraine has deployed a dense network of passive SIGINT sensors (some covertly, some on high-ground positions) that provide continuous mapping of Russian EW emissions. This data feeds targeting systems enabling strikes on Russian EW vehicles — which, when active, are highly detectable by their emissions. Numerous Russian Krasukha and Zhitel systems have been destroyed after emission-based location.

5.3 Nota and Pidzhak DEWS

Vehicle-mounted tactical drone jamming systems produced by Ukrainian firms; Nota covers 2.4/5.8 GHz FPV control frequencies and is now standard equipment on Ukrainian armoured vehicles. Pidzhak extends this to broader drone communication bands. Production of tens of thousands of units/year has been achieved.

5.4 Commercial Sector Integration

Ukraine has uniquely leveraged its commercial technology sector — drawing on software engineers from IT companies like Grammarly, EPAM and others and hardware specialists from startups — to develop EW solutions at speeds impossible in traditional defence procurement. The "Army of Drones" and related programmes have generated EW countermeasures within weeks of new Russian threats emerging.

6. Western EW Systems Supplied to Ukraine

Several Western EW systems have been transferred to Ukraine:

• AN/MLQ-40 Prophet (US): Ground-based SIGINT and EW system; reported in Ukrainian service for communications intelligence collection
• EWOS (UK): Electronic Warfare Operational Support systems providing ELINT data-sharing and analysis
• German EW contributions: Germany has provided EW support equipment under classified channels; details limited but confirmed by Bundeswehr statements
• Palantir integration: The US data analytics firm Palantir's systems, integrated into Ukrainian command infrastructure, include EW data fusion capabilities that aggregate SIGINT into operational intelligence
• SHORAD EW: Several SHORAD systems transferred include integrated EW functions — SHORAD Stryker radar, IRIS-T air defence radar with EW component

7. Vehicle-Mounted EW Proliferation

One of the most significant EW trends of 2024–2026 is the proliferation of vehicle-mounted drone jamming down to the squad level on both sides:

• Nearly all Ukrainian armoured vehicles now carry at least a directional FPV jammer (Nota or equivalent)
• Russian infantry are issued Russian-made Zhuk or similar hand-held jammers as standard kit in actively contested sectors
• Purpose-built "EW technical vehicles" (converted civilian vans and trucks mounting multiple omnidirectional antenna arrays) have become a ubiquitous feature of both frontlines
• This proliferation has created a complex electromagnetic ecosystem where drone pilots on both sides must constantly adapt frequencies and routes to find "corridors" through the jamming layers

8. GPS Warfare: Jamming and Spoofing at Scale

GPS warfare has been a distinctive feature of the Ukraine conflict with broad implications:

• Russia's Pole-21 and associated systems have created GPS denial zones extending tens of km from the front line in several sectors
• GPS spoofing — transmitting false GPS signals to mislead receivers — has been documented affecting civilian flights in the Baltic Sea region and eastern Romania, attributed to Russian EW at Kaliningrad and east Ukraine
• US-supplied JDAM-ER (GPS-guided glide bomb) effectiveness has been repeatedly reported degraded in high-jamming sectors; Ukraine has resorted to INS-only or optical-terminal-guidance modes as backup
• Western weapons programmes have accelerated GPS-denial resilience as a result of Ukraine lessons: anti-jam GPS receivers are now standard on all new US JDAM variants
• Ukraine's response includes multi-constellation GNSS receivers using Russian GLONASS as a spoofing-detection check, laser inertial guidance backups, and commercial Starlink positioning as a GPS substitute in some applications

9. Communications Warfare

The electromagnetic communications battlefield is equally intense:

• Russia's Leer-3 and MSSS systems have continuously intercepted Ukrainian military mobile phone communications; Ukraine has progressively shifted to encrypted military radio (Harris FALCON III and similar) for sensitive communications
• Ukraine's ELINT networks provide continuous tracking of Russian radio-emitting units — a key targeting input for artillery counterfire and long-range strike planning
• Starlink's resilience vs Russian jamming attempts has been a strategic EW duel: Russia has reportedly achieved partial degradation of Starlink terminals closest to the front, while SpaceX has continuously updated firmware to maintain link reliability
• Russia's Leer-3 psychological operation component — sending SMS messages to Ukrainian soldiers — has had limited tactical impact but represents an ongoing capability that Ukrainian phone discipline must address

10. Assessment: Who Leads in EW?

The honest assessment is nuanced:

• Russian advantages: Scale of deployed systems, strategic coverage (Murmansk-BN, Krasukha-class), doctrinal integration of EW into combined-arms operations, GPS denial infrastructure, drone EW density near front
• Ukrainian advantages: Rapid innovation cycle (weeks vs Russian months), commercial sector integration, Western ELINT support, SIGINT-based targeting of Russian EW (turning EW platforms into liabilities), Starlink resilience
• Trend: Russia's EW advantage has narrowed significantly since 2022. Ukraine's counter-EW maturity has grown faster than Russian EW capability expansion. The arms race continues with no decisive winner
• Critical lesson for NATO: Electromagnetic environment management is fundamental, not peripheral; every future force design must assume a highly contested EW environment from day one

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