Ursula von der Leyen and Ukraine: The EU's Champion for Accession and Sanctions

Background

Ursula von der Leyen (born 8 October 1958, in Brussels) is a German politician who served as Germany's Defense Minister (2013–2019) before becoming President of the European Commission — the EU's executive branch — in December 2019. She is the first woman to hold the Commission presidency.

Her Commission term began with the COVID-19 pandemic (managing the EU's vaccine procurement), but it was the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February 2022 that defined her presidency's historical significance. Under her leadership, the EU transformed from a primarily economic organization into a geopolitical actor providing significant financial, political, and (indirectly) military support to a country at war.

Initial Response to the Invasion (February 2022)

Within hours of Russia's 24 February 2022 invasion, von der Leyen delivered a statement declaring that "the European Union stands with Ukraine." Within 24 hours, the Commission had prepared the first package of sanctions targeting Russian financial institutions, oligarchs, and government officials.

Her most quoted statement came on 27 February 2022 — three days into the invasion — when she told Euronews that Ukraine "belongs to the European family" and that the EU would work to "make them closer to us." This formulation, quickly embraced by Ukrainian President Zelensky, had significant political weight because it implied a policy commitment (accession) that the EU had previously been reluctant to state definitively for Ukraine.

Leading 14 Sanctions Packages

The EU's sanctions regime against Russia, orchestrated by the Commission under von der Leyen's leadership, became one of the most comprehensive economic sanction programs in history — unprecedented in scope for a G20 economy. From February 2022 through 2025, the EU adopted 14 sanctions packages.

Key Elements of the Sanctions

• Financial sanctions: Cutting major Russian banks from SWIFT, freezing approximately €300 billion in Russian Central Bank assets held in EU and allied jurisdictions
• Energy sanctions: Banning Russian coal imports (fifth package, April 2022), then Russian crude oil by sea (sixth package, December 2022 phase-in), then petroleum products
• Technology restrictions: Banning exports of semiconductors, advanced machinery, aerospace components, and other dual-use goods to Russia
• Personal sanctions: Asset freezes and travel bans on over 1,500 individuals including Putin, senior ministers, oligarchs, military commanders, and propagandists
• Media bans: Suspending RT (Russia Today) and Sputnik broadcasting in the EU
• Transport sanctions: Closing EU airspace to Russian aircraft, banning Russian-flagged shipping from EU ports

Challenges

Achieving consensus among 27 EU member states on sanctions — including Hungary (often sympathetic to Russia) — required intensive diplomatic work. Von der Leyen and Commission trade teams spent significant effort negotiating carve-outs, transition periods, and country-specific exceptions (such as pipeline gas exemptions for landlocked countries dependent on Russian supply) to maintain the unanimity required for EU foreign policy decisions.

Shadow fleet circumvention, which allowed Russia to continue exporting oil via third-country tankers, became a persistent enforcement challenge that subsequent packages addressed with shipping and tracking measures.

Securing EU Candidate Status (June 2022)

One of von der Leyen's most consequential actions was her Commission's accelerated Opinion on Ukraine's EU membership application — completed in record time after Ukraine filed its formal application on 28 February 2022 (four days after the invasion).

Normally, the Commission's Opinion on an accession application takes years. For Ukraine, von der Leyen's Commission delivered it in four months — recommending candidate status with specific reform conditions attached. The European Council then voted unanimously to grant Ukraine and Moldova candidate status on 23 June 2022.

This was geopolitically significant because: candidate status provided Ukraine with a political anchor that would survive changes in European governments; it committed the EU institutionally (not just rhetorically) to Ukraine's European future; and it created a reform framework that the Commission could use to leverage Ukrainian governance improvements.

Kyiv Visits and Symbolism

Von der Leyen visited Kyiv multiple times during the conflict — among the most frequent senior Western visits. Early visits (spring 2022) required overnight train journeys from Poland due to the active air war. Later visits included assessment of war damage, meetings with Zelensky, and ceremonies connected to EU accession milestones.

Her visual signature — wearing Ukrainian blue and yellow, standing in destroyed areas, meeting with Ukrainian families — was deliberately symbolic: projecting European solidarity at a time when some EU member governments (Hungary, initially Italy, later Slovakia) were more equivocal about the depth of European commitment.

Frozen Russian Assets

One of the most complex financial and legal issues von der Leyen's Commission navigated was the use of approximately €300 billion in frozen Russian Central Bank assets. The assets were frozen (asset owners cannot move or sell them) but not confiscated (ownership was not transferred).

Outright confiscation — transferring the assets to Ukraine — raised significant legal and financial stability concerns: it might set precedents that would undermine confidence in the euro as a reserve currency and expose EU member states to retaliatory confiscation of Western assets in Russia/China.

Von der Leyen's Commission arrived at a pragmatic solution: use the windfall profits (interest earnings) generated by the frozen assets — approximately €3 billion per year — for Ukraine. This approach was legally cleaner and became the basis of the G7's "Extraordinary Revenue Acceleration" (ERA) loans scheme, announced in June 2024, which committed $50 billion in loans to Ukraine backed by the interest income from frozen Russian assets. The EU contributed approximately €35 billion of this. This arrangement, strongly promoted by Von der Leyen and the Commission, represented an innovative use of frozen assets as collateral without the legal and financial stability risks of direct confiscation.

The €50 Billion Ukraine Facility (2024–2027)

The Ukraine Facility, proposed by the Commission in June 2023 and approved by the European Parliament and Council in February 2024 after Hungary's blocking veto was overcome, provides €50 billion to Ukraine over four years (2024–2027). It represents the largest coordinated EU financial support package for a single country in EU history.

Structure

• €33 billion in loans
• €17 billion in grants
• Linked to reform "milestones" in areas including judicial independence, anti-corruption, administrative reform — aligned with EU accession requirements
• Provides budget support (direct government budget financing) in addition to project financing

Hungary Veto and Resolution

Hungary under Viktor Orbán repeatedly blocked EU Council agreements on Ukraine support, including the Ukraine Facility. The resolution came at the December 2023 European Council: other EU leaders maneuvered Hungary into abstention by offering separate meetings on Hungary's EU funding disputes, allowing the facility to pass without unanimous agreement under alternative legal bases.

Von der Leyen managed this diplomatic challenge while maintaining the Commission's legal authority and not conceding substantive policy ground to Hungary's demands regarding Ukraine.

Accession Negotiations (2024)

On 25 June 2024, the EU formally opened accession negotiations with Ukraine — a historic milestone that von der Leyen described as "a triumph of the spirit over force."

Ukraine's accession process is formally structured around 35 negotiating "chapters" covering the full body of EU law (the acquis communautaire). The pace of negotiations is unprecedented: the Commission began screening chapters within weeks of the formal opening, and multiple chapters were provisionally closed in 2024 — a pace reflecting both Ukrainian reform momentum and strong political will on the EU side.

Von der Leyen's Commission specifically designed the accession process to run in parallel with Ukraine's wartime governance — recognizing that waiting for the war's end before meaningfully advancing negotiations would both miss reform momentum and deny Ukraine the political signal of real progress.

Key challenges: Ukraine's anti-corruption track record, judicial independence reforms, minority language rights (affecting relations with Hungary), and the simple practical reality that full membership requires Ukraine to implement the entire body of EU law — a process that historically takes 5–15 years even in peacetime.

Re-election as Commission President (July 2024)

Von der Leyen was re-elected as European Commission President on 18 July 2024, confirmed by the European Parliament with 401 votes in favor — a narrower than expected margin that reflected tensions with some left-wing groups over migration policy and her handling of the Gaza conflict rather than Ukraine policy.

Her second Commission term, beginning in December 2024, explicitly placed Ukraine alongside climate transition, industrial competitiveness (the "Draghi report" agenda), and EU defense capacity as headline priorities. The Commission's new defense portfolio — the first dedicated EU defense commissioner — reflected the war's impact on EU institutional architecture.

Ukraine as EU Geopolitical Accelerator

Perhaps von der Leyen's most significant achievement — and the one with the longest-term consequences — is that Ukraine's war accelerated the transformation of the EU from primarily an economic actor into a geopolitical one. The pace and scope of changes under her presidency exceeded what had occurred in the previous decade:

• EU military aid: The EU's European Peace Facility (EPF) was used for the first time to co-fund lethal military aid to Ukraine — a fundamental break from EU's "civilian power" tradition
• EU defense industry: The Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP), the European Defense Industry Reinforcement through common Procurement Act (EDIRPA), and the European Defence Investment Programme (EDIP) all emerged under von der Leyen's Commission specifically in response to Ukraine war lessons
• EU enlargement revival: Ukraine's candidacy revived the EU enlargement process that had been effectively frozen since Croatia's accession in 2013; Western Balkans and Moldova also benefited from the renewed enlargement momentum
• Strategic autonomy: The concept of EU "strategic autonomy" — reducing dependencies on external actors, especially energy from Russia and technology from China — accelerated dramatically as the Commission led Europe's energy diversification away from Russian gas in 2022–2023

Whether the EU ultimately delivers on Ukraine's membership — and what a war-damaged, partially occupied Ukraine in the EU means for EU institutions — remains the central unresolved question of von der Leyen's legacy.

Frequently Asked Questions

What did Ursula von der Leyen do for Ukraine?

Led 14 EU sanctions packages against Russia, secured Ukraine's EU candidate status in June 2022, negotiated the €50B Ukraine Facility, opened formal accession negotiations in June 2024, and facilitated use of frozen Russian asset interest for Ukraine (~$3B/year as part of G7 ERA scheme).

When did Ukraine get EU candidate status?

23 June 2022 — four months after Ukraine's application, in the fastest candidate status decision in EU history.

What is the €50B Ukraine Facility?

A 2024–2027 EU financial support package (€33B loans + €17B grants), tied to Ukrainian reform milestones for EU accession. Approved February 2024 after Hungary's blocking veto was managed.

Was she re-elected?

Yes — confirmed as Commission President for a second term by the European Parliament on 18 July 2024, with 401 votes. Her second term began December 2024.