Russia's Use of Imperial History: Denying Ukrainian Nationhood

One of the most distinctive features of Russia's ideological preparation for the 2022 invasion was an intensive deployment of historical arguments. Vladimir Putin published a 5,000-word essay in July 2021 titled "On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians," arguing that Russians and Ukrainians are "one people" divided by Western manipulation. This was not a scholarly argument but a political programme dressed in historical language — and its claims are comprehensively contradicted by professional historians.

Putin's Historical Claims

Putin's July 2021 essay made several interconnected arguments. First, that Ukrainians and Russians share a common origin in Kyivan Rus and therefore constitute a single nation. Second, that Ukrainian national identity was artificially constructed — initially by Austro-Hungarian authorities in Galicia and later by Soviet policy. Third, that the Soviet-era borders of Ukraine were arbitrary gifts from Lenin and Stalin, with no legitimate basis. Fourth, that NATO expansion and Western influence had converted Ukraine into an "anti-Russia" — a hostile state being used to attack Russian interests. These arguments were not new; they had circulated in Russian nationalist circles for decades. But their articulation by the head of state, months before a major invasion, signalled that they were now official policy rather than fringe opinion.

The 'One People' Narrative: Origins and Functions

The "one people" narrative has deep roots in imperial Russian ideology. The concept of a "triune Russian nation" — Great Russians, Little Russians (Ukrainians), and White Russians (Belarusians) — was a cornerstone of Tsarist imperial ideology from the 18th century. It served to justify imperial control over territories that clearly had distinct languages, customs, and self-perceptions. The narrative was always contested: Ukrainian intellectuals, writers, and activists had been developing and asserting a distinct Ukrainian identity since at least the early 19th century, culminating in Taras Shevchenko's poetry, the works of Mykhailo Hrushevsky, and the political programme of the Ukrainian People's Republic (1917–1921). The "one people" narrative functions primarily to deny legitimacy to Ukrainian statehood — if Ukrainians are Russians, then an independent Ukrainian state is by definition an anomaly requiring correction.

Soviet Policy and Ukrainian Identity

Putin's claim that Ukrainian identity was a Soviet creation is historically inverted. Soviet policy toward Ukrainian identity was actually more repressive than constructive. The "Executed Renaissance" (Rozstriliane Vidrodzhennia) of the 1930s saw hundreds of Ukrainian writers, intellectuals, and artists executed or sent to the Gulag under Stalin. The Holodomor (1932–1933) famine that killed millions of Ukrainians was accompanied by attacks on Ukrainian cultural institutions and the mass killing of the Ukrainian intelligentsia. The Soviet state periodically "korenizatsiya" (nativization) policies in the 1920s did support Ukrainian language and culture, but these were reversed under Stalin and Ukrainian was systematically suppressed during the 1970s-1980s. The Ukrainian identity that emerged by 1991 was not a Soviet creation but had survived in spite of Soviet repression.

Academic Refutations

Professional historians have comprehensively rejected Putin's historical claims. Serhii Plokhy of Harvard University notes that Kyivan Rus was not a Russian state — Moscow did not exist during most of the Kyivan Rus period (9th–13th centuries). The population of Kyivan Rus were the common ancestors of Ukrainians, Russians, and Belarusians, not specifically Russians. Timothy Snyder of Yale argues that Putin's historical essay represents a form of eliminationist thinking — the denial of a people's existence as a step toward justifying violence against them. Historians of nationalism note that the argument that a people cannot be a nation because they share origins with another people would delegitimise dozens of recognised nations whose populations share historical roots.

Historical Analogies and Their Limits

Russia's use of historical arguments draws on several analogies and comparisons. The "Novorossiya" (New Russia) concept invokes the 18th-century Tsarist administrative unit that encompassed much of southern Ukraine, suggesting these areas are naturally Russian. The concept of "protecting Russian speakers" echoes Weimar-era German arguments about ethnic Germans in neighbouring states — an analogy Western historians note with alarm. The framing of Ukraine as artificial and the West as orchestrating its anti-Russian posture mirrors Soviet-era ideological frameworks about Western interference in socialist countries. None of these historical analogies withstand critical scrutiny, but they serve an important domestic function: legitimising aggression through a historical language that sounds scholarly while being fundamentally political.

FAQ

Is Putin's claim that Ukrainians and Russians are one people shared by most Russians?

Public opinion surveys in Russia before the war showed significant majorities viewing Ukrainians as a "brotherly people" somewhat separate from Russians. Putin's "one people" framing is an extreme position not universally shared even within Russia, though the war and propaganda have shifted opinion.

Did Lenin actually create Ukraine?

The borders of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic were determined through a complex process of revolution, civil war, and territorial negotiations in 1917–1921. Lenin made some decisions favouring Ukrainian administrative boundaries, but framing this as Ukraine's creation ignores centuries of distinct Ukrainian history.

What is the "Executed Renaissance"?

The Rozstriliane Vidrodzhennia ("Executed Renaissance") refers to the generation of Ukrainian writers, poets, artists, and intellectuals killed under Stalin in the 1930s. Estimates suggest hundreds were executed and thousands imprisoned or exiled — representing a deliberate assault on Ukrainian cultural life.

How has Ukraine's national identity changed since 2022?

Polish, and other Western survey data show a significant shift in Ukrainian identity since 2022: increased use of Ukrainian language among Russian speakers, increased identification as Ukrainian rather than Soviet, and rejection of Russian cultural claims. Russia's invasion has functioned as a powerful national unifier.

Is the "one people" argument used to justify specific military actions?

Yes. It was explicitly cited by Putin to claim that Russia was not invading a foreign country but restoring unity with a wayward part of the Russian nation — a framing that denies Ukraine's status as a sovereign state deserving the protections of international law.

Sources

1. Putin, Vladimir. "On the Historical Unity of Russians and Ukrainians." Kremlin.ru, 12 July 2021.
2. Plokhy, Serhii. The Origins of the Slavic Nations: Premodern Identities in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus. Cambridge University Press, 2006.
3. Snyder, Timothy. "The War in Ukraine Is a Colonial War." The New Yorker, 28 April 2022.
4. Yekelchyk, Serhy. Ukraine: Birth of a Modern Nation. Oxford University Press, 2007.
5. Plokhii, Serhii. The Russo-Ukrainian War: The Return of History. W.W. Norton, 2023.