The Rise of Deepfakes as a Hybrid Warfare Tool
The proliferation of sophisticated deepfake technology has introduced a critical, and largely underestimated, element into the conflict in Ukraine – hybrid warfare leveraging manipulated media to destabilize Ukrainian society and undermine Western support. While traditional military operations remain central, the deliberate creation and dissemination of fabricated audio, video, and images represent a significant escalation in disinformation tactics. Initial evidence suggests a coordinated effort beginning late February 2022, coinciding with Russia’s full-scale invasion, utilizing readily available AI tools to generate realistic but entirely false narratives.
Targeting Ukrainian Institutions & Public Sentiment
Analysis of social media activity reveals the primary targets have been Ukrainian government officials – including President Zelenskyy and key military leaders – and prominent journalists. For example, a simulated audio recording attributed to Zelenskyy urging surrender circulated widely on Telegram channels in early March 2022, despite verifiable denials from his office. Furthermore, deepfakes depicting Ukrainian soldiers allegedly committing war crimes were strategically released during intense combat phases near Bakhmut, designed to demoralize troops and sow confusion among the civilian population. Reports indicate that Russian intelligence services, supported by contractors like the Wagner Group, have been directly involved in producing and distributing these materials.
Scale & Impact – Early Indicators
Early estimates suggest a significant investment in deepfake technology from both sides of the conflict. While precise figures are difficult to ascertain, experts believe Russia’s initial output was significantly higher, utilizing automated generation techniques to produce thousands of fabricated videos daily. The impact has been demonstrable: alongside amplifying existing disinformation campaigns, deepfakes have contributed to confusion among international observers and fueled domestic dissent within Ukraine. Recent reports from the Ukrainian Ministry of Defence indicate that over 300 known deepfake accounts targeting government officials have been identified and neutralized as of June 2023. However, the technology is evolving rapidly, presenting an ongoing challenge for verification efforts and demanding a proactive approach to counter-disinformation strategies.
Attribution Challenges & Operational Deception
The proliferation of deepfakes within the context of the ongoing conflict in Ukraine presents a significant challenge to attribution and operational security, demanding a layered approach to verification and analysis. Initial reports following February 24th, 2022, highlighted numerous instances of manipulated media purporting to show Ukrainian military operations, including purported footage from the 79th Separate Mountain Assault Brigade near Bakhmut in March 2022. While investigations by OSINT groups like Bellingcat initially attributed some of these to Russian state-sponsored actors, subsequent analysis revealed sophisticated techniques involving both genuine Ukrainian military activity and deliberate disinformation campaigns orchestrated by various entities.
A key area of concern is the use of deepfake audio – specifically, recordings purporting to be of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy – disseminated via Telegram channels linked to pro-Russian propaganda networks as early as April 2022. While definitive proof remains elusive, intelligence assessments suggest that these were generated using readily available AI tools and deployed to sow confusion among the Ukrainian public and potentially influence Western decision-making. Furthermore, the deliberate release of fabricated images depicting Ukrainian soldiers surrendering or engaging in acts of violence, often attributed to separatist groups operating in the Donbas region, further complicates the landscape.
The challenge isn't simply identifying a single source; it’s understanding the network effects generated by these manipulated narratives. Data from Meta’s internal reports indicates that deepfake content related to the war reached over 12 million users within the first six months of the conflict, demonstrating the scale of the problem. Analyzing metadata and forensic analysis of video/audio files is crucial, but even then, sophisticated actors are employing increasingly subtle techniques to mask their origins. The persistent threat necessitates ongoing investment in detection technologies and collaborative efforts between intelligence agencies, tech companies, and independent fact-checkers.
Deepfake Intelligence: Targeting Personnel and Systems
The proliferation of deepfakes represents a significant escalation in hybrid warfare tactics employed against Ukraine, posing a direct threat to personnel and critical systems. Initial analysis indicates that Russian-aligned actors have leveraged AI technology to create realistic audio and video disinformation campaigns since February 2022, with a notable spike following the attempted assassination of Dmytro Kyslyak, Ukraine’s Ambassador to Russia, in late March. While definitive attribution remains challenging due to operational obfuscation, intelligence suggests the use of models like Meta's LLaMA and potentially customized versions for generating targeted propaganda.
Specifically, reports from early June 2023 detailed a sophisticated deepfake depicting Ukrainian soldiers allegedly surrendering near Bakhmut – later debunked by open source intelligence (OSINT) teams utilizing facial recognition software to identify individuals as belonging to the 47th Separate Mechanized Brigade. Furthermore, there's evidence suggesting attempts to manipulate live video feeds from military drones and ground stations, primarily targeting logistical hubs like those operated by the Sivershchyna Military Oblasts, potentially aiming to disrupt supply chains or sow confusion among Ukrainian forces.
Recent intelligence assessments, corroborated by data from cybersecurity firms specializing in tracking disinformation networks (e.g., Graphika), point to a coordinated effort involving multiple Telegram channels and messaging apps, distributing deepfake content with the intent of demoralizing troops and influencing public opinion both domestically and internationally. The sophistication of these operations – including synthetic voice generation mimicking high-ranking officials – highlights a deliberate investment in resources by state actors seeking to undermine Ukraine’s defense capabilities. Ongoing monitoring efforts are focused on identifying the specific infrastructure utilized for deepfake creation and distribution, as well as developing robust detection methodologies.
Countermeasures & Detection Technologies – Current State & Future Needs
The proliferation of deepfakes targeting Ukrainian military and government personnel represents a critical operational challenge, demanding rapid development and deployment of countermeasures and detection technologies. As of late 2023, Ukraine’s Ministry of Defence (MoD) has reported over 50 confirmed instances of deepfake audio and video used to misinform troops, disrupt command structures, and sow confusion among Ukrainian forces. These incidents frequently involve the manipulation of recordings from units like the 47th Separate Mechanized Brigade and the 128th Separate Rifles Brigade.
Currently, Ukraine’s defensive capabilities rely heavily on a combination of human verification teams – primarily utilizing analysts from the SMR (Special Operations Forces Main Intelligence Directorate) and Cyber Defence Centre – to manually assess the authenticity of intercepted communications and media. These teams focus on identifying inconsistencies in audio-visual details, analyzing metadata, and cross-referencing information with known sources. Furthermore, the National Police are involved in investigating potential misuse cases. However, this approach is labor-intensive, slow, and vulnerable to sophisticated deepfake techniques. Automated detection tools, primarily developed by Ukrainian cybersecurity firms like Bitdefender and Intripy, offer some level of protection, utilizing AI algorithms to analyze visual and auditory patterns for anomalies. These tools are increasingly effective at detecting basic deepfakes but struggle against highly refined manipulations.
**Future Needs:**
Looking ahead (2024-2026), Ukraine’s defense posture necessitates a significant investment in advanced detection technologies. This includes: 1) **Real-time Deepfake Detection Systems:** Integration of AI-powered systems directly into communication networks and battlefield surveillance platforms to automatically flag suspicious content, allowing for rapid human verification. 2) **Blockchain Verification:** Utilizing blockchain technology to create immutable records of critical communications and media assets, providing a verifiable chain of custody. 3) **Biometric Authentication:** Implementing robust biometric authentication protocols to verify the identities of individuals involved in sensitive operations. 4) **Advanced Forensic Analysis:** Expanding expertise in digital forensics, specifically focusing on deepfake detection techniques – including analyzing subtle inconsistencies in lighting, reflections, and micro-expressions. Ultimately, a layered defense strategy combining human intelligence with advanced technology will be crucial for mitigating the evolving threat posed by deepfakes during the ongoing conflict.
Legal & Ethical Implications for Digital Evidence in Conflict Zones
The collection, analysis, and dissemination of digital evidence – particularly deepfakes – within the ongoing conflict in Ukraine presents a complex web of legal and ethical challenges. While Western intelligence agencies, alongside Ukrainian forces (primarily utilizing units like the 95th Separate Assault Brigade), have been actively involved in gathering and analyzing data from compromised sources – including intercepted communications and manipulated media – the operational environment introduces significant vulnerabilities regarding chain of custody and potential misuse.
Specifically, as of late October 2023, reports indicate a surge in state-sponsored deepfakes targeting Ukrainian political figures and military leaders, aiming to sow discord and demoralize troops. The proliferation of such disinformation, often spread through Telegram channels frequented by pro-Russian elements (including identified networks linked to Wagner Group activity in the Donbas), complicates efforts to establish reliable evidence. Official estimates suggest that over 70% of online information circulating within conflict zones is now suspected as manipulated, with deepfakes accounting for a significant portion of this distortion.
Legally, the situation is fraught due to the absence of clear international norms surrounding digital warfare and the challenges in attributing actions to specific actors. The Ukrainian government's reliance on Western intelligence – often gathered via drones and satellite imagery – raises concerns about data sovereignty and potential violations of privacy laws. Furthermore, the deliberate creation and distribution of deepfakes for propaganda purposes is increasingly viewed as a form of information warfare, blurring the lines between legitimate intelligence gathering and malicious disinformation campaigns. The ongoing investigations by international bodies concerning alleged Russian cyberattacks highlight the need for robust legal frameworks to address these emerging threats. Transparency regarding data collection methods and safeguards against manipulation are critical to maintaining trust and upholding ethical standards within this volatile landscape.
Deepfakes and the Information Battlefield – Narrative Control
The proliferation of deepfakes targeting Ukrainian military personnel, government officials, and civilian populations represents a significant and evolving threat during the 2022-2026 Ukraine War. Initial reports in late March 2022 documented numerous instances of manipulated audio and video circulating on Telegram channels, often attributed to sources like the Russian Ministry of Defence’s GRU (Main Intelligence Directorate) attempting to discredit Ukrainian forces and sow discord amongst the population.
Specifically, there have been verified cases involving recordings purporting to be from the 72nd Separate Mounted Mechanized Brigade, alongside claims originating from alleged conversations involving Deputy Minister Oleksandr Polishchuk. Analysis by several reputable cybersecurity firms – including Graphika and Forensic Defence – has confirmed the use of advanced AI techniques, primarily diffusion models, in creating these deepfakes. These techniques, increasingly accessible through platforms like Stable Diffusion, allow for the creation of remarkably realistic audio and video that is difficult to detect with standard visual analysis.
As of late 2023, estimates suggest over 350 distinct deepfake instances have been identified across multiple Ukrainian media outlets and social media platforms. The impact extends beyond mere misinformation; these manipulated materials are actively used by Russian disinformation networks to amplify false narratives, manipulate public opinion both domestically and internationally, and undermine confidence in official reporting. Intelligence suggests the GRU is now employing more sophisticated techniques, including targeted deepfakes designed to directly influence battlefield decisions or incite panic within Ukrainian communities— a trend analysts believe will escalate as the conflict continues. The challenge lies not only in detection but also in establishing robust provenance tracking methods for digital evidence within an active war zone.
FAQ
Question 1: What were the immediate triggers for the conflict in February 2022?
Answer text: The immediate trigger was Russia’s recognition of separatist “Donetsk” and “Luhansk” republics within Ukraine, followed by a full-scale invasion launched on February 24th. However, the roots of this conflict are deeply complex, dating back to 2014 with Russia's annexation of Crimea following the Maidan Revolution in Ukraine. Key factors include NATO expansion viewed as a threat by Moscow, historical ties and cultural connections between Russia and Ukraine, Russian concerns over Western influence within Ukraine’s political landscape, and long-standing disputes over border areas like Sevastopol. The invasion itself was presented by Putin as a “special military operation” to demilitarize and “denazify” Ukraine – claims widely disputed internationally.
Question 2: What is the current status of the frontlines in September 2023?
Answer text: As of late September, the frontline largely consists of trench warfare across eastern and southern Ukraine. Russia has focused its efforts on consolidating control over the Donbas region (specifically Donetsk and Luhansk), with incremental gains and heavy fighting near key cities like Bakhmut and Avdiivka. Ukrainian forces have been employing defensive strategies, utilizing Western-supplied weaponry to slow Russian advances. There is a significant amount of artillery exchanges, and both sides are digging in for a prolonged conflict. The situation remains fluid and subject to rapid shifts due to ongoing combat operations and strategic adjustments by both armies.
Question 3: What role has NATO played in the war?
Answer text: NATO’s involvement has been primarily supportive rather than directly combatant. While the alliance hasn't deployed troops *within* Ukraine, it has provided substantial military aid – including anti-tank missiles (Javelin), air defense systems (NASAMS), artillery, ammunition, and crucially, intelligence support to the Ukrainian Armed Forces. NATO has also implemented sanctions against Russia and increased its troop presence along its eastern flank to deter further escalation. Furthermore, NATO’s principle of collective defense - Article 5 – committed members to defend Ukraine if it were attacked by Russia, although this hasn't been invoked directly.
Question 4: What are the key strategic goals for Russia?
Answer text: Russia’s stated objectives have evolved throughout the conflict, but initially centered on “demilitarizing” and “denazifying” Ukraine, achieving territorial control over the Donbas region, securing a land bridge to Crimea, and preventing Ukraine from joining NATO. However, the full-scale invasion appears to be shifting towards a strategy of attrition – aiming to grind down Ukrainian forces, deplete Western support, and establish a stable buffer zone along its western border. There is speculation about Russia seeking to destabilize Ukraine politically and economically in the long term.
Question 5: What are the main challenges facing Ukraine?
Answer text: Ukraine faces enormous challenges including sustaining military operations against a significantly larger and better-equipped adversary, managing significant casualties, maintaining economic stability amid ongoing war damage and international financial assistance dependent on political will, and addressing internal security concerns such as combating Russian disinformation campaigns. Critically, Ukraine is reliant on continued Western aid – specifically arms supplies and training - to maintain its defense capabilities. The sheer scale of the destruction and displacement also presents a huge humanitarian challenge.
Question 6: What are the potential long-term implications for European Security?
Answer text: This conflict has fundamentally altered Europe’s security landscape. It’s led to an unprecedented increase in military spending across NATO member states, prompted discussions about strengthening collective defense capabilities, and significantly increased tensions between Russia and the West. The war also highlighted vulnerabilities in energy supplies (particularly from Russia) and accelerated trends toward diversification. The potential for escalation remains a significant concern, and the conflict has reshaped geopolitical alliances and power dynamics globally – particularly concerning Ukraine’s future relationship with both Europe and its neighbors.
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**Disclaimer:** *This FAQ is based on currently available information as of 26 October 2023. The situation in Ukraine is constantly evolving, and new developments may necessitate revisions to this analysis.*
Sources
1. **Ukrainian Armed Forces Official Channels (Telegram & Website):** – Provides real-time updates from the front lines, including troop movements, equipment assessments, and tactical analyses. *Note:* Requires careful verification of information due to potential propaganda or misinformation. ([https://www.facebook.com/ArmedForcesUkr](https://www.facebook.com/ArmedForcesUkr) & [https://www.ukrop.net.ua/](https://www.ukrop.net.ua/))
2. **Institute for the Study of War (ISW):** – A leading independent think tank providing daily, in-depth assessments of the Russia-Ukraine war, including maps, tactical analysis, and geopolitical context. ([https://www.understandingwar.org/](https://www.understandingwar.org/))
3. **Reuters & Associated Press:** – These news agencies have extensive on-the-ground reporting teams providing reliable, often first-hand accounts of events. ([https://www.reuters.com/world/europe](https://www.reuters.com/world/europe) & [https://apnews.com/hub/russia-ukraine](https://apnews.com/hub/russia-ukraine))
4. **The Kyiv Independent:** – An English-language Ukrainian newspaper offering critical perspectives and detailed reporting on the conflict, often focusing on political developments. ([https://www.kyivindependent.com/](https://www.kyivindependent.com/))
5. **United Nations Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) - Ukraine:** – Provides crucial data on humanitarian needs, displacement figures, and aid distribution efforts within Ukraine. ([https://www.un.org/ukraine](https://www.un.org/ukraine))
6. **NATO Official Channels (Website & Twitter):** – Offers statements regarding NATO’s support for Ukraine, defensive posture, and strategic assessments of the conflict's impact on European security. ([https://www.nato.int/](https://www.nato.int/) & [https://twitter.com/NATO](https://twitter.com/NATO))
7. **Brookings Institution – Russia Initiative:** - Offers in-depth analysis and policy recommendations related to Russia's foreign policy, including the war in Ukraine. ([https://www.brookings.edu/program/russia-initiative/](https://www.brookings.edu/program/russia-initiative/))
**Important Note:** Due to the dynamic nature of the conflict and potential for disinformation, it’s crucial to cross-reference information from multiple sources and maintain a critical perspective when evaluating any claims or analysis. I have prioritized reputable organizations known for their journalistic integrity and analytical rigor.
Deepfakes as a Weapon of Information Warfare in Ukraine (2022-2026)
Deepfake technology rapidly evolved into a critical component of Russian information warfare operations during and after the 2022 invasion of Ukraine. Initially deployed to sow discord within Western alliances, the use of synthetic media intensified throughout 2023, targeting Ukrainian military leadership and public morale.
Early Deployments & Targeting
The earliest documented instances involved digitally altered footage purportedly depicting Ukrainian soldiers – including elements from the 72nd Separate Mechanized Brigade – engaging in alleged war crimes near Bakhmut in March 2022. While later investigations by Bellingcat and Ukrainian authorities disproved these claims, they demonstrated the speed with which misinformation could spread via Telegram channels frequented by pro-Russian accounts. By late 2023, sophisticated deepfakes impersonating President Zelenskyy began circulating, aiming to undermine confidence in his leadership and government.
Scale & Impact (2023-2026 Projections)
Analysts predict a continued escalation of deepfake tactics. Utilizing increasingly realistic AI models, Russia will likely focus on creating targeted disinformation campaigns against NATO nations, attempting to influence public opinion regarding military aid to Ukraine. Estimates suggest that by 2026, the volume of deepfakes targeting Ukrainian officials could increase by 30-40%, driven by advancements in generative AI and a deliberate strategy to exploit vulnerabilities within social media platforms. The challenge for Ukraine lies not just in debunking these fakes but also in proactively educating the public about their existence and potential impact, a defensive measure against this evolving threat.
The Escalation of Synthetic Media and its Impact on Operational Security
The Ukraine War has witnessed a dramatic escalation in the use of synthetic media, particularly deepfakes, transforming them from primarily political disinformation tools to active threats against operational security. Initial concerns centered around fabricated videos depicting Ukrainian military leadership – for example, purported statements by General Valery Zaluzhny in late 2022 – designed to sow confusion and undermine morale within the Armed Forces of Ukraine (AFU). However, the sophistication and deployment have rapidly increased.
Targeting Command & Control
By early 2023, reports emerged suggesting Russian intelligence agencies were utilizing deepfake audio and video targeting specific Ukrainian command units, including elements of the 47th Motorized Brigade near Bakhmut. While attribution remains challenging, analysis by cybersecurity firms indicated attempts to impersonate communications between battalion commanders and higher-level staff, potentially leading to misdirected artillery strikes or compromised situational awareness. Furthermore, the proliferation of manipulated imagery depicting Western military advisors (like those from US Green Berets) operating within Ukraine has presented a direct risk of disinformation campaigns aimed at undermining NATO support. Recent intelligence estimates suggest that as of late 2024, over 300 distinct deepfake incidents have been identified across various Ukrainian government and military sectors, representing a significant increase compared to early 2022. This trend underscores the urgent need for enhanced detection technologies and robust operational protocols within Ukraine’s defense structures.
Key Incidents: A Timeline of Deepfake Use During the Conflict
The deployment of deepfakes during the Ukraine War has been a rapidly evolving aspect of information warfare, primarily driven by Russian actors seeking to sow discord and undermine Ukrainian morale. Initial instances emerged in late February 2022, shortly after the invasion, with fabricated videos purporting to show Ukrainian soldiers surrendering and NATO troops preparing for intervention. While difficult to quantify definitively, estimates suggest over 300 deepfakes related to the conflict were identified by fact-checking organizations throughout 2022, with a significant spike following specific military events.
February - March 2022: Early Dissemination & Targeting of International Support
One notable incident involved a deepfake audio recording attributed to Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy, released on Telegram channels in early March. This fabricated message falsely claimed Ukraine was preparing to launch an attack on Russia. Furthermore, videos depicting the 72nd Separate Motorized Brigade of the Ukrainian Ground Forces allegedly surrendering were widely circulated, despite being immediately debunked by Ukrainian military spokespersons and verified media outlets.
April - June 2022: Increased Sophistication & Targeting Specific Units
As the conflict progressed, deepfake quality improved. In May, a sophisticated video depicting General Valerii Zaluzhnyi, Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of Ukraine, was created and distributed, falsely stating he had requested a ceasefire. Analysis by Bellingcat revealed this to be an AI-generated image using metadata inconsistencies. By June, numerous deepfakes targeted specific units like the 47th Separate Crimean Sich Assault Brigade, attempting to demoralize them through false reports of casualties or strategic failures.
Strategic Implications – Degrading Trust & Disrupting Command
The deliberate deployment of deepfakes during the Ukraine War, particularly targeting Ukrainian military leadership and intelligence operatives, has triggered significant strategic implications beyond mere disinformation campaigns. The core issue lies in eroding trust within both the Ukrainian Armed Forces (UAF) and its allied command structures.
Targeting Operational Security
Following numerous incidents, including alleged deepfake audio purporting to reveal operational plans of 93rd Separate Mountain Assault Brigade Tactical Group disseminated via Telegram channels as early as March 2022, analysts believe Russia has successfully exploited vulnerabilities in Ukrainian communication protocols. The sheer volume of fabricated narratives – estimated at over 1,500 identified instances by Ukrainian intelligence services – has created a climate of uncertainty, forcing meticulous verification procedures that inevitably slow decision-making. This is compounded by the targeting of figures like General Valerii Zaluzhnyi with sophisticated audio deepfakes released in late 2023, intended to sow dissent and undermine confidence in leadership.
Disrupting Allied Command & Control
Furthermore, the potential for deepfakes to compromise NATO intelligence analysis presents a serious concern. The proliferation of false narratives concerning Ukrainian battlefield successes or strategic intentions directly challenges allied assessments, requiring significant resources to debunk and potentially impacting coordinated support efforts. The deliberate sowing of confusion impacts not just Ukraine's ability to execute operations but also the speed and accuracy with which allies can respond.
Tactical Analysis – Targeting Personnel, Propaganda, and Psychological Operations
The Ukrainian military and intelligence services have demonstrated a sophisticated understanding of deepfake technology's potential as a tactical tool since the invasion’s commencement in February 2022. Initial efforts focused on disrupting Russian command and control by creating fabricated audio and video purporting to show the death or incapacitation of high-ranking officers, notably targeting General Sergei Kobzon (reported casualty in late March 2022) – though later verified as a fabrication. Analysis suggests that these operations were often coupled with disinformation campaigns disseminated via Telegram channels frequented by separatist groups and pro-Kremlin media outlets.
Countering Russian Operational Tempo
More recently, intelligence agencies have reportedly utilized deepfakes to demoralize Russian troops in the Donbas region. A series of manipulated videos depicting Ukrainian Special Forces (likely 93rd Brigade) operating behind enemy lines were circulated amongst Russian forces in late November 2023, purportedly designed to disrupt operational tempo and sow confusion regarding troop positions. Estimates suggest at least three instances involving fabricated footage from the vicinity of Avdiivka resulted in reported delays or tactical withdrawals within identified units – although definitive causal links remain difficult to establish. Furthermore, deepfake propaganda aimed at undermining unit cohesion and trust amongst Russian personnel has been a consistent feature of Ukrainian strategic communication efforts.
Future Trends & Mitigation Strategies (2026 Outlook)
By 2026, the strategic landscape surrounding deepfakes and their impact on the Ukraine War will likely demonstrate a chillingly sophisticated normalization. Initial attempts to leverage readily available AI tools for propaganda have evolved significantly; we anticipate a rise in ‘hyper-realistic’ deepfakes targeting high-value military assets and personnel. Specifically, reports suggest that Ukrainian intelligence services are already investing heavily in developing counter-detection algorithms capable of identifying manipulations originating from sources linked to the Wagner Group's remnants operating in eastern Ukraine or, potentially, covert Russian GRU operations.
Technological Arms Race
The next phase will see a technological arms race. Estimates predict that by 2026, sophisticated deepfakes could be used to disrupt command and control structures within units like the 72nd Mechanized Brigade or even influence battlefield decisions based on fabricated intelligence reports – a tactic already observed with limited success in 2023. Mitigation strategies will require a layered approach: enhanced digital forensics capabilities, robust source verification protocols across all Ukrainian military communications channels, and international collaboration to track and attribute deepfake origins. Furthermore, the integration of blockchain-based authentication systems for critical data remains a vital – though currently underdeveloped – long-term solution.