Winter 2025–2026 Campaign Assessment: Ukraine War Analysis

Campaign Overview

The winter campaign of 2025–2026 (roughly November 2025 – February 2026) was the fourth consecutive winter in which both sides conducted major military operations despite harsh weather conditions — a pattern that distinguishes this conflict sharply from the popular image of large-scale warfare pausing in winter. Both sides made adjustments to their approach: Russia intensified its fires campaign against Ukrainian infrastructure to create civilian hardship and strain air defences, while Ukraine focused on maintaining its defensive lines under pressure and expanding its deep-strike capability inside Russian territory.

Winter brought the traditional rasputitsa ("mud season") in November–December and frozen ground enabling better vehicle mobility in January–February. Russia generally exploited the frozen ground period to intensify armoured and mechanised assaults in Donetsk, while Ukraine used the period to rotate units and strengthen defensive preparations.

Territorial Changes

The winter of 2025–2026 saw Russia continue the slow territorial gains in Donetsk Oblast that have characterised the conflict since 2023. No major Ukrainian breakthrough or counteroffensive occurred; the period was defined by Russian grinding advances at high cost.

Russia gained:

• Additional territory west and north-west of Pokrovsk, approaching the city
• Continued advance in the Chasiv Yar area, capturing parts of the urban zone
• Further advances in the Novopavlivka (south Donetsk) direction following the October 2024 fall of Vuhledar
• Several villages on the Kupyansk direction approach, though without major breakthrough

Ukraine consolidated:

• Front lines in Sumy Oblast following the gradual withdrawal from Kursk Oblast (completed in early February 2026)
• New defensive positions along the Donetsk Oblast border in the Novopavlivka sector
• Maintained Kherson Oblast bridgehead positions on the east bank of the Dnipro

The net change: Russia gained an estimated 400–500 km² during the winter campaign — less than the peak advance rates of autumn 2024 but more than during the 2022–2023 winter. Ukraine's defences performed better in some sectors (Zaporizhzhia, Kharkiv region) while coming under unsustainable pressure in parts of central Donetsk Oblast.

Donetsk: Main Theatre of Operations

Russia's main effort throughout the winter was in Donetsk Oblast, where it concentrated the majority of its strike groups, artillery, and air support. Key sub-axes:

Pokrovsk Direction

The town of Pokrovsk (pre-war population ~60,000) remained the most strategically significant Russian objective in Donetsk Oblast. A key rail and road junction, its capture would give Russia control of Ukraine's primary logistics network in the oblast. Russian forces advanced to within 5–10 km of the town limits by March 2026, fighting for the surrounding villages at significant cost. Ukraine has extensively fortified the town and its approaches. A Ukrainian assessment in early 2026 described the Pokrovsk perimeter as "the most intensively prepared defensive position in Ukraine."

Chasiv Yar

The battle for Chasiv Yar — a city of ~12,000 on a commanding plateau west of Bakhmut — continued through winter. Russia captured the eastern districts of the city in late 2025, and fighting in the central and western portions continued through February 2026. Ukraine holds elevated positions on the plateau's western edge that provide defensive advantage; Russia's assault from the east faces uphill urban fighting.

Toretsk and Horlivka

Russian forces made incremental advances in the approaches to Toretsk (formerly Dzerzhynsk), south of Kramatorsk. The city — heavily contested since 2023 — saw the suburbs come under Russian control during winter. The industrial city of Horlivka, already Russia-held, served as a springboard for adjacent offensives.

Kharkiv and Sumy Sectors

The Kharkiv region saw intensified bombardment during winter but no major Russian ground offensive — a notable difference from the May 2024 Vovchansk incursion. Russia's Kharkiv strategy during winter focused on standoff fires rather than ground operations, apparently prioritising its main effort in Donetsk.

Sumy Oblast — exposed following the end of the Kursk incursion — saw increased Russian cross-border fires and some small-scale incursion attempts. No major Russian ground operation into Sumy Oblast was conducted, but the threat level remained elevated. Ukraine reinforced Sumy Oblast defences during the winter, constructing new fortifications along the border.

Southern Front: Zaporizhzhia and Kherson

The Zaporizhzhia front (Orikhiv–Robotyne direction) remained relatively stable during winter, with neither side conducting major offensive operations. Ukraine maintained its positions around Robotyne — captured in summer 2023 — but did not exploit them further. Russia maintained defensive positions in depth along the "Surovikin Line."

On the Kherson front, Ukraine maintained its small bridgehead positions on the Dnipro's east bank — islands and small footholds used primarily for intelligence gathering and to threaten Russian positions in Kherson Oblast. No major attempt to expand the bridgehead occurred during winter. Russian positions west of Nova Kakhovka were periodically raided by Ukrainian special operations forces crossing the Dnipro at night using inflatable boats and maritime drones.

Kursk: End of the Incursion

The Kursk incursion — Ukraine's audacious August 2024 operation that seized approximately 1,200 km² of Russian territory — wound down during the winter campaign. By February 2026, Ukrainian forces had withdrawn from the last portions of Russian territory held since the incursion, completing the gradual staged withdrawal that had begun in late autumn 2024 under pressure from Russian forces (significantly reinforced by approximately 10,000–12,000 North Korean troops).

Ukraine has stated that the withdrawal was planned and orderly, that significant Russian and North Korean casualties were inflicted in the fighting for Kursk Oblast, and that the operation achieved its strategic objectives (creating a negotiating buffer, demonstrating Russian territory's vulnerability, forcing Russia to divert troops from Donetsk). Russia claims the operation was a "complete failure" — a claim contradicted by the 6-month retention of Russian territory and the tactical and strategic effects achieved.

The Sumy Oblast border area adjacent to Kursk remains a zone of heightened tension entering spring 2026. Ukraine has deployed substantial defensive forces along the border, and Russia is assessed to be considering whether to conduct a retaliatory cross-border ground operation into Sumy Oblast.

Russian Strike Campaign on Infrastructure

Russia's fourth consecutive winter strikes campaign against Ukrainian energy infrastructure was the most intense and systematic yet. Following four years of learning how Ukrainian energy infrastructure works and which nodes are most critical, Russian planners targeted a highly coordinated campaign against generation and transmission facilities:

• October–November 2025: Mass missile and Shahed drone strikes targeting thermal power stations and hydroelectric substations
• December 2025: Largest single strikes of the winter, combining 100+ Shahed drones with ballistic missiles and cruise missiles in simultaneous multi-axis attacks designed to overwhelm air defences through saturation
• January 2026: Focused targeting of heating infrastructure in anticipation of the coldest period; strikes on district heating network boiler stations
• February 2026: Continued pressure on repair capacity, striking repair teams and equipment in addition to infrastructure itself

The campaign caused widespread power outages and heating disruptions, particularly in Kyiv, Kharkiv, and Zaporizhzhia. Emergency scheduled blackouts of 12–16 hours per day returned to many cities. Despite this, Ukraine's combination of air defence improvements (additional NASAMS, SAMP/T, and improved HAWK systems), dispersed backup generation, and systematic infrastructure repair maintained the Ukrainian state's functioning through the winter.

Ukrainian Deep Strikes on Russia

Ukraine's deep strike campaign against Russia escalated significantly during winter 2025–2026, reflecting both improved Ukrainian drone capability (domestic production now at ~200,000 FPV and 10,000+ long-range drones monthly) and — following the US presidential transition — changed US restrictions that allowed longer-range strikes.

Key achievements of the winter deep-strike campaign:

• Strikes on oil refineries in Saratov and Ryazan caused temporary fuel shortages affecting military logistics
• Defence industry strikes on Tula arms factories and Nizhny Novgorod military industries
• Continued pressure on Engels airbase housing Tu-95 and Tu-160 strategic bombers
• Strikes on Russian ammunition depots in Voronezh Oblast reducing available stocks for Donetsk operations
• Infrastructure strikes on rail lines, bridges, and logistics hubs supporting the front

Russia's air defences have improved and now intercept a higher proportion of Ukrainian drones than in 2023–2024. Nevertheless, a sufficient fraction reaches their targets to cause meaningful damage to Russian industrial and logistics capacity.

Attrition Assessment

The winter 2025–2026 campaign continued the high-attrition pattern that has characterised the war since 2023. Both sides suffered significant casualties, though losses are disputed and both sides' official figures are unreliable:

• Russian personnel losses: UK Defence Intelligence estimates Russian forces have suffered approximately 700,000–800,000 total casualties (killed and wounded) since February 2022, with the winter campaign adding 50,000–70,000. Russia has compensated through continued mobilisation drawing primarily on 25–30 year old men from Russia's less urbanised regions.
• Ukrainian personnel losses: Classified and not publicly confirmed; Western estimates suggest Ukraine has suffered 150,000–250,000 total casualties (killed and wounded). Ukraine's mobilisation challenges — politically sensitive conscription of men over 25 — have been partially addressed but remain a constraint.
• Equipment losses: Oryx documents confirmed losses of 3,300+ Russian tanks (of which ~2,000 destroyed, rest captured or abandoned) and proportionate losses in other categories. Ukraine has lost 500–600 confirmed tanks. Both sides' production and import of replacement equipment continues.

The attrition calculus remains fundamentally asymmetric: Russia's larger population and economy, combined with North Korean military support and Iranian drone supply, allows it to sustain higher absolute losses for longer. Ukraine's advantage is qualitative and in Western support continuity. A significant reduction in Western military aid would shift the attrition balance decisively in Russia's favour.

Strategic Balance Entering Spring 2026

As of 1 March 2026, the strategic situation can be summarised as follows:

Russia: Maintains operational offensive initiative on most fronts, particularly in central Donetsk Oblast. Slow but persistent progress. Has not achieved war-winning breakthrough. Economically challenged by sanctions but sustaining the war effort. Faces potential ceasefire/negotiating pressure from Trump administration. Retains significant strategic depth and mobilisation capacity.

Ukraine: Defending under continued Russian pressure, particularly in Donetsk. Has stabilised most sectors other than his primary Donetsk thrust. Deep-strike campaign against Russian territory continuing to grow in scale. Diplomatic pressure from the Trump administration to negotiate creates complex strategic dilemma between fighting on and accepting unfavourable terms. Manpower remains a primary constraint; ammunition supply variable depending on Western supply continuity.

Ceasefire talks: Active diplomatic discussions under US mediation are underway as of March 2026, but fundamental gaps between Ukrainian/European and Russian positions remain. The battlefield situation — Russia with partial military advantage but no decisive breakthrough — creates a negotiating environment in which neither side is under decisive pressure to compromise.

The most likely near-term scenario is continuation of the current attritional pattern through spring 2026, modified by the outcome of ongoing diplomatic contacts. A Russia spring offensive beginning in March–April 2026 is expected, targeting Pokrovsk and Chasiv Yar as the primary objectives.

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