Night Aviation Support Operations in the Ukraine War

Night aviation operations in the Ukraine war demanded adaptations that challenged the pre-war doctrines of both sides. The dense surface-to-air missile environment that developed from February 2022 onward pushed both Ukrainian and Russian fixed-wing aircraft to low altitudes and short exposure times, while helicopters — their natural low-altitude environment coinciding with MANPADS ranges — faced severe attrition. Night operations became a calculated trade: reduced effectiveness of portable air defense systems under darkness, at the cost of increased aircrew workload, navigation risk, and coordination complexity with ground forces.

The Tactical Logic of Night Air Operations

The proliferation of MANPADS — shoulder-fired surface-to-air missiles including the Stinger, Igla, and Starstreak — on both sides of the Ukraine conflict created a daytime environment deeply hostile to low-altitude aviation. The thermal seekers of modern MANPADS are effective in daylight at ranges of 5–6 km against helicopter-sized targets. Night conditions impose significant operational limitations on most MANPADS operators: target acquisition is harder, visual tracking during missile flight is impaired, and command detonation systems rely on visible target identification.

This created incentive for night-timed aviation missions. Ukrainian and Russian helicopter and ground-attack sorties increasingly shifted toward late evening, midnight, and pre-dawn windows not because of superior night capability — both sides' aviation was limited in genuine night-fighting equipment — but because the marginal degradation of MANPADS effectiveness at night exceeded the degradation imposed on the aviators themselves. The asymmetry of risk calculation made night the safer time to fly low.

Helicopter Nap-of-the-Earth Flying at Night

Nap-of-the-earth (NOE) flying — extremely low altitude flight following terrain contours to remain below radar and missile-guidance envelopes — was standard Russian helicopter doctrine before the Ukraine war, practiced extensively in Afghanistan and Chechnya. In Ukraine, NOE flight at night represented the primary technique used by Ka-52 and Mi-28N attack helicopters operating in the eastern and southern theatres.

The Ka-52's GOES-451 electro-optic/infrared turret and the Mi-28N's designation system provided limited night attack capability, but the primary advantage of NOE at night was survivability rather than offensive precision. Flying at 10–30 metres above terrain, helicopters exploited ground clutter to defeat medium and long-range air defense systems such as the Buk family and S-300, while relying on darkness to complicate MANPADS acquisition. Russian Ka-52 crews conducting Vikhr missile attacks on Ukrainian armored vehicles in the Kherson and Zaporizhzhia frontages routinely operated at dawn and dusk, the "gray slots" offering the best compromise of detection avoidance and targeting capability.

Ukrainian Mi-24 Hind helicopters, lacking the advanced sensor fit of Russian equivalents, operated almost exclusively at night under visual flight rules using NVGs. Missions primarily involved troop resupply to surrounded positions in the early phases of the war and later attack missions using unguided rockets and cannon fire against Russian positions. The Mi-24's age and the lack of electronic upgrades made night precision strike a secondary capability, but the platform's survivability improved markedly when confined to darkness.

Su-25 Low-Level Night Missions

The Su-25 Frogfoot ground-attack aircraft, operated by both Ukraine and Russia, was designed as a daylight close air support platform. Its sensors — a simple optical sight and limited navigation system — were not optimized for night operations. Nevertheless, both sides flew Su-25 missions at night throughout the conflict, relying on modified approaches to compensate for sensor limitations.

Ukrainian Su-25 pilots flying night missions typically relied on pre-planned attack profiles against fixed or semi-fixed targets whose coordinates were established beforehand by artillery observers or drones. A target grid reference permitted a navigation run to the attack point without requiring real-time target acquisition. Weapons employed — S-13 unguided rockets, RBK cluster munitions, and bombs — did not require terminal guidance. The pilot executed the attack profile at planned heading and altitude, released the weapons, and immediately descended to NOE altitude for egress.

NVG and FLIR Integration in Manned Aircraft

The integration of NVGs into Ukrainian fixed-wing aviation was limited early in the conflict but gained momentum as Western partners provided equipment and training. Piloting a high-performance jet aircraft under NVGs demands specialized training for the perceptual distortions introduced by the devices — reduced depth perception, limited field of view, and the "soda straw" effect of tunnel vision at high approach speeds. Ukrainian Air Force personnel received NVG familiarization through Western training programs, with evidence of Su-25 and MiG-29 sorties flown under NVGs from 2023 onward.

Russian fixed-wing aviation incorporated NVGs more systematically in Su-34 strike aircraft, where the pilot and weapon systems officer could combine NVG navigation with the aircraft's ground-attack FLIR system for terminal target acquisition. Su-34 night sorties against Ukrainian infrastructure targets in the deep battle became a regular feature of Russian strike campaigns in 2022–2024, timed to exploit Ukrainian air defense engagement issues at night.

Drone Coordination with Manned Aircraft at Night

Drone coordination with manned aviation represented a genuinely novel tactical development in Ukraine. Ukrainian forces developed procedures in which observation drones using thermal cameras identified targets at night and then vectored manned aircraft onto those targets via voice communication over radio. The drone operator, watching the target on a thermal display, could call corrections — "left 200, range 800" — while the pilot executed the attack run on NVGs. This collaboration extended the effective night attack capability of aircraft with limited onboard sensors.

The risk of simultaneous airspace occupation by drones and manned aircraft created deconfliction challenges. Unlighted commercial drones are effectively invisible to low-flying pilots at night, and several collisions and near-misses were reported. Both sides developed altitude deconfliction protocols: manned aircraft operated at or below 100 metres during attack runs while observation drones maintained 200 metres or above in the target area, with FPV attack drones cleared to lower altitudes only after manned aircraft egressed.

Risks and Tactical Adaptations

Night aviation imposed elevated risk even compared to already-dangerous daytime operations. Navigation error in NOE flight led to controlled-flight-into-terrain incidents on both sides. Crew fatigue from high-tempo night operations degraded performance. Electronic warfare — the dense jamming environment present across the Ukrainian front — disrupted GPS navigation on which NVG pilots depended heavily, requiring dead-reckoning alternatives that increased error margins.

Despite these risks, the operational return justified the investment. Ukrainian helicopters supplying the Azovstal steel plant defenders in Mariupol in March–April 2022 flew under darkness, accepting extreme risk to sustain a strategically important defence. Russian helicopter-delivered Vikhr missile attacks at dawn conducted in the Vuhledar area in early 2023 demonstrated continued Russian commitment to NOE rotary wing tactics despite significant losses. In both cases the calculus was clear: night operations, for all their hazards, offered better survival odds than daytime equivalents in a MANPADS-saturated environment.

FAQ

What is nap-of-the-earth flying and why is it used?

Nap-of-the-earth (NOE) flying is extremely low altitude flight, typically 10–50 metres above terrain, following the contours of the ground to maintain radar and missile masking. It is used to avoid detection by ground-based radars, complicate missile guidance solutions for medium and long range systems, and reduce exposure time in the threat envelope. The technique demands intensive pilot skill and carries significant collision risk with terrain and obstacles.

Did Ukraine receive any Western aircraft with night attack capability?

Ukraine received F-16A/B Fighting Falcons from Netherlands and Denmark beginning in 2024, which include AN/APG-66 radar and compatibility with night targeting pods. These significantly enhanced Ukraine's night precision strike capability compared to legacy Soviet aircraft. However, the number of delivered aircraft and pilot training pipeline meant F-16 night operations remained limited in scale during 2024–2025.

How did MANPADS threats differ at night?

MANPADS—particularly IR-guided variants—require visual acquisition for the operator to track the target and verify seeker lock. At night, visual acquisition is degraded for operators without NVGs, making it harder to aim and track the missile after launch. Radar-guided SHORAD systems are less affected by darkness. This created a partial but meaningful reduction in MANPADS effectiveness that incentivized night sorties.

Can commercial drones safely operate in the same airspace as manned aircraft at night?

Not without explicit deconfliction agreements and coordination. Commercial drones are not visible to pilots without aircraft lights illuminated — which in combat reveals the drone's position to the enemy. Both sides developed altitude-based separation protocols, but these required constant communication discipline to enforce. Night airspace coordination became a significant challenge as drone density increased throughout 2023–2025.

What were the main causes of night aviation losses?

Causes included MANPADS engagement despite darkness (partial rather than complete reduction in threat), surface-to-air missile fire from larger systems using radar rather than IR, controlled flight into terrain during NOE navigation, and equipment failure exacerbated by maintenance shortfalls under combat conditions. Both sides also suffered losses from friendly fire incidents where ground air defense systems misidentified returning aircraft as threats — a particular risk with limited IFF capability at night.

Sources

1. Justin Bronk, RUSI, The Ukrainian Air Force Against Russian Layered Air Defenses, 2022–2023 series.
2. Tom Cooper, Big Sky, Little Bullets: Ukraine Air Force Air Combat Operations 2022–2023, Helion, 2023.
3. Aviation Safety Network, incident records for Ukrainian and Russian military aviation, 2022–2025.
4. Ukrainian Air Force Command, public briefings on night sortie rates and tactics, 2023–2024.
5. Stijn Mitzer and Joost Oliemans, Oryx, documented aircraft losses with method of loss classification, 2022–2025.