Helicopter Raids at the Frontline: Rotary-Wing Operations in the Ukraine War

Helicopters entered the Ukraine war with historically validated roles — close air support, troop transport, and reconnaissance — but quickly encountered an environment more lethal than any rotary-wing force had faced since the Soviet-Afghan war. The combination of ubiquitous MANPADS, radar-directed anti-aircraft artillery, and — from 2023 onward — FPV drones operating at altitudes previously considered safe for low-flying helicopters created unprecedented attrition on both sides. By the end of 2025, combined Russian and Ukrainian helicopter losses confirmed by open-source analysis exceeded 350 airframes, a figure that fundamentally reshaped how both militaries employed their remaining rotary-wing assets.

Russian Gunship Operations: Ka-52 and Mi-28

Russia's primary attack helicopter, the Kamov Ka-52 Alligator, entered the war as the most advanced rotary-wing platform in the Russian inventory. With its distinctive coaxial rotor design, advanced avionics suite including GOES-451 electro-optical targeting, and Vikhr-1 anti-tank missile capability, the Ka-52 was assessed by analysts as a capable platform for the suppression role. In the first weeks of the invasion, Ka-52s operated at relatively high altitudes in nap-of-earth profiles, using terrain masking to approach Ukrainian defensive positions along the Kherson, Mykolayiv, and Kyiv fronts. Losses were immediate and severe: MANPADS teams equipped with Stingers, Starstreaks, and indigenous Ukrainian Igla systems destroyed multiple Ka-52s in the opening weeks, often on video that circulated globally and provided intelligence on Russian helicopter tactics.

The Glide Bomb Pivot

By mid-2022, Russian helicopter crews had adapted to the extreme MANPADS threat through a tactic that increased survivability at the cost of accuracy: the stand-off delivery of S-8 and S-13 unguided rockets from distances beyond MANPADS minimum engagement range, combined with Kh-25ML and Vikhr launches from extended ranges. The Ka-52 demonstrated the ability to fire Vikhr-M missiles at targets 8–10 kilometers away while maintaining a terrain-masking profile, theoretically outside Stinger engagement envelopes. However, this reduced the effectiveness of each attack compared to close-in fire, and the helicopters remained vulnerable during the approach and egress phases of each mission.

Ukrainian Rotary Wing: Mi-8 and Mi-24

Ukraine entered the war with a substantial Mi-8 transport helicopter fleet and a smaller Mi-24 gunship inventory. The Mi-24 "Hind," one of the most recognizable combat helicopters in history, was employed in the classic combined-arms role for which it was designed — escorting Mi-8 transports, conducting fire suppression against infantry positions, and providing direct fire support to ground forces. Ukrainian Mi-24 crews, many with decades of experience, developed aggressive low-altitude tactics using terrain features in the Kherson flatlands and Donbas river valleys for masking. The introduction of AGM-114 Hellfire missiles adapted for Ukrainian Mi-8s in 2022–2023, using a modified targeting pod arrangement, gave Ukrainian transport helicopters a precision anti-armor capability not designed into the original airframe.

Terrain Masking and Nap-of-Earth Tactics

Both sides refined terrain masking tactics to survive in the MANPADS-dense environment. The flat agricultural terrain of southern Ukraine provides limited natural masking, forcing crews to use treelines, embankments, and even grain elevator structures as cover during approach legs. In the more varied terrain of the Kharkiv region and parts of northern Donetsk, river valleys and forested zones allowed more effective nap-of-earth flight. Russian Ka-52 crews adopted a "pop-up attack" profile: flying at 2–5 meters above ground along a covered approach route, then briefly climbing to 20–30 meters to acquire the target and fire before immediately descending again. Ukrainian MANPADS teams adapted to this by positioning observers beyond the terrain features to provide early warning of approach.

Night Operations

Night flying significantly reduced the effectiveness of visual-spectrum MANPADS engagement but introduced new risks. Both sides' helicopters operating at night faced the additional hazard of drone activity, with FPV drones relying on thermal sighting capable of tracking helicopter heat signatures. Ukrainian operators reported Mi-8 losses to FPV drones during night medevac flights in 2024, a development that forced altitude and route changes for missions that had previously been considered relatively low-risk operations far from the immediate front line.

The FPV Drone Threat to Helicopters

From 2023 onward, FPV drones became an increasing threat to low-flying helicopters. A helicopter operating below 300 meters — the standard regime for terrain-masking flight — is well within the operational envelope of larger FPV and commercial drone platforms. Multiple Ukrainian helicopter losses, including at least two Mi-8s confirmed in open-source video, were attributed to FPV drone attacks, some apparently deliberate ambushes at known helicopter landing zones. This threat has pushed both sides to extend their operational altitudes in lower-threat areas, accepting reduced terrain masking but lowering the FPV risk, and to increase hover time minimization at exposed landing zones.

Frequently Asked Questions

How many helicopters has Russia lost in Ukraine?

As of early 2026, Oryx's confirmed open-source count of Russian helicopter losses exceeded 190 airframes across all types, with actual total losses (including unconfirmed) estimated considerably higher by Ukrainian intelligence.

What MANPADS has Ukraine used most effectively against helicopters?

The American FIM-92 Stinger and British Starstreak have been credited with the most helicopter kills in Ukrainian service. The Starstreak's laser-beam-riding guidance makes it resistant to standard IR-flare countermeasures, giving it particular effectiveness against helicopters equipped with flare dispensers.

Why does Russia keep using helicopters despite heavy losses?

Helicopters provide time-sensitive close air support and troop transport capabilities that fixed-wing aircraft and drones cannot fully replicate, particularly for casualty evacuation, rapid resupply to isolated positions, and the delivery of anti-tank fire in direct support of attacking infantry.

Has Ukraine received new helicopters during the war?

Yes. Ukraine received UH-60 Black Hawk helicopters from the United States and additional Mi-17 helicopters from several Central and Eastern European countries that transferred their Soviet-era fleets. France has reportedly agreed in principle to Caracal helicopter deliveries.

What is "nap-of-earth" flying?

Nap-of-earth (NOE) flight is a technique where a helicopter flies as close to the ground surface as possible — typically 5–15 meters — using terrain features to mask the aircraft from radar and visual detection. It maximizes tactical surprise but requires intense crew skill and increases collision risk.

Sources

1. Oryx Blog, "Attack on Europe: Documenting Russian Equipment Losses During the Invasion of Ukraine — Helicopters," oryxspioenkop.com, updated 2026.
2. Aviation Week & Space Technology, "Ka-52 Alligator Combat Performance in Ukraine: An Assessment," aviationweek.com, June 2023.
3. David Hambling, "How Ukraine's Drones Are Shooting Down Russian Helicopters," Forbes, November 2023.
4. UAWire, "Ukrainian Air Force Helicopter Operations: Adaptation under Fire," uawire.org, April 2024.
5. Justin Bronk (RUSI), "MANPADS and the Suppression of Russian Rotary Wing Aviation," RUSI Commentary, rusi.org, March 2022.