Offensive Electronic Warfare Campaigns in the Ukraine War

Electronic warfare — the contest for control of the electromagnetic spectrum through jamming, spoofing, direction-finding, and signals intelligence — has been a defining feature of the Ukraine conflict. Russia entered the war with the most capable ground-based electronic warfare force in the world by equipment count and theoretical doctrinal development, yet found that capability only partially translatable into operational advantage against a Western-equipped and rapidly learning Ukrainian opponent. Simultaneously, Ukraine developed offensive EW capabilities that targeted Russian command networks and disrupted Russian electronic systems. The result was one of the most intense electromagnetic competitions in modern military history, shaping outcomes from individual drone engagements to strategic strike accuracy.

Russian GPS Jamming Campaigns Against HIMARS

The delivery of HIMARS to Ukraine in June 2022 was widely identified by Russian analysts as a priority threat. HIMARS and the M270 MLRS fire GMLRS rockets that rely primarily on GPS for precise mid-course navigation, with an inertial navigation backup. GPS-dependent precision munitions are, in theory, susceptible to GPS jamming — denial of the satellite signal causes the guidance system to fall back on inertial navigation alone, increasing Circular Error Probable (CEP) from approximately one metre to potentially tens of metres depending on flight time.

Russia deployed GPS jamming systems — including versions of the Krasukha-2O and Pole-21 ground-based jammers — in an effort to degrade GMLRS accuracy over Russian-held territory. The Pole-21 system, which can create GPS denial zones of several tens of km radius, was reported in multiple front-line positions throughout 2022–2023. Russian EW assets were also positioned on elevated terrain or in tower-mounted configurations to increase jamming effective range against incoming trajectories.

The effect of this jamming campaign on GMLRS performance is a matter of documented but contested evidence. Ukrainian and Western officials periodically acknowledged GPS jamming affecting precision munitions, and the U.S. responded by providing GMLRS variants with enhanced anti-jam GPS receivers. Some analysts assessed that Russian jamming degraded GMLRS CEP from roughly one metre to several metres in heavily jammed corridors — still within effective lethal radius for most logistics targets but reduced against small, precision targets like bridges or specific building rooms. The competition drove rapid Western GPS receiver upgrades and the use of inertial/GPS hybrid guidance systems less susceptible to jamming.

Ukrainian EW Strikes on Russian Communication Nodes

Ukraine developed offensive EW capability through a combination of pre-war investment, Western assistance, and the acquisition of intelligence about Russian EW system locations through signals intelligence collection. Ukrainian EW teams used direction-finding equipment — building on Western-provided systems and legacy Soviet direction-finding assets — to locate Russian EW emitters based on their own transmissions, then targeted them with artillery, drones, or combined strikes.

Ukrainian strikes on Russian EW systems were documented through Oryx visual confirmation and Ukrainian military announcements through 2022–2024. The targeting logic was straightforward: Russian EW systems that jam Ukrainian communications or GPS must themselves emit electromagnetic signals to function. These emissions are detectable and localizable. Ukraine treated Russian EW vehicles — Krasukha-4, Borisoglebsk-2, Leer-3 — as high-priority targets equivalent to radar systems, accepting that finding and destroying them would reduce the electromagnetic threat cover over Ukrainian precision fires.

Krasukha-4 Targeting: Electronic Warfare vs. Electronic Warfare

The Krasukha-4 is a Russian ground-based broadband active jamming system designed primarily to jam airborne radar systems — AWACS and synthetic aperture radar — at ranges claimed up to 300 km. In Ukraine, Russia deployed Krasukha-4 systems to suppress both airborne surveillance and the signals used by Ukrainian long-range strike systems. Ukrainian forces documented the presence of multiple Krasukha-4 systems operating in occupied territory and on Russian soil near the border.

At least several Krasukha-4 systems were reportedly destroyed during the conflict — their destruction announced by Ukrainian intelligence. The Krasukha-4's operational signature (it emits powerful signals when active) facilitates targeting; its significant physical size and deployment requirement from a large truck platform limits concealment options. Each destroyed Krasukha-4 represented a gap in Russia's electronic attack coverage that Ukraine's air operations and strike planning could exploit, at least until a replacement was positioned.

Murmansk-BN: Long-Range Shortwave Jamming

The Murmansk-BN is Russia's long-range over-the-horizon (OTH) shortwave communication jamming system, capable of disrupting HF radio communications at ranges of 5,000–8,000 km. Its deployment in the Ukraine war was intended to degrade NATO's ability to communicate with Ukrainian forces and to disrupt long-range HF communication links used by certain Ukrainian command elements. The Murmansk-BN's antenna systems are enormous — requiring hundreds of metres of mast infrastructure — and were deployed in Russian territory well beyond strike range of 2022-era Ukrainian precision weapons.

The system's impact was significant in the HF communication bands it targeted, but Ukraine's progressive adoption of Starlink and UHF/SHF satellite links reduced dependence on HF communications for most tactical and operational purposes, limiting the Murmansk-BN's practical impact on operations by 2023. It remained a potent tool for disrupting broader NATO-Ukraine communications in the HF spectrum but lost relevance as communication infrastructure modernized.

Impact on Precision Weapons Accuracy

The overall assessment of Russian EW's impact on Ukrainian precision weapons accuracy suggests partial but not decisive degradation. Russian jamming increased GMLRS CEP in contested corridors but Ukrainian adaptation — including anti-jam GPS upgrades, loitering target confirmation, and re-striking with multiple rounds — maintained effective strike capability. The most significant impact may have been psychological: awareness that jamming could affect accuracy forced Ukrainian targeting to be more methodical, use redundant strike systems, and invest in SEAD (Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses) operations alongside precision fires.

FAQ

Can GPS jamming completely defeat a GMLRS rocket?

No. GPS jamming forces the guidance system to rely on its internal inertial sensors, which drift over time but maintain reasonable accuracy for short flights. A GMLRS rocket in flight for 60–80 seconds to maximum range accumulates relatively small inertial error — CEP may increase to 10–30 metres in a strong jamming environment rather than the nominal one metre with GPS, but the rocket still arrives in the general target area. Against large targets like fuel depots or rail junctions, this degradation is manageable. Against small targets, additional rounds are required.

How did Ukraine find and target Russian EW vehicles?

Russian EW vehicles must emit electromagnetic signals to function — jamming requires actively transmitting radio-frequency energy. These emissions are detectable by signals intelligence equipment at ranges of tens of km. Ukraine's direction-finding networks, supplemented by Western SIGINT sharing, could triangulate the position of active Russian EW emitters to within metres when multiple receivers observed the same emission. Once located, the target was assigned to artillery or drone strike. EW operators aware of this vulnerability faced a dilemma: turn off the system and lose its effect, or keep it active and invite targeting.

What is the Krasukha-4 designed to do, and how was it used in Ukraine?

The Krasukha-4 is designed as an active broadband noise jammer against airborne radar systems, primarily to defeat NATO AWACS (Airborne Warning and Control Systems) and synthetic aperture radar reconnaissance aircraft. In Ukraine, it was also used against satellite uplinks and to create GPS jamming in its operational environment. Its primary contribution was degrading the NATO and Ukrainian air surveillance picture over Russian-held territory, making it harder for Ukraine to maintain continuous radar tracking of Russian aviation activity.

Did Ukraine have comparable offensive EW systems to Russia?

Ukraine entered the war with a smaller and less modern EW inventory than Russia but received significant Western EW assistance. This included electronic support measures (signals intelligence), communications intelligence systems, and electronic attack systems for drone communication jamming. Ukraine's EW grew substantially in capability through 2022–2024, aided by Western technology transfer and the reorientation of the domestic defense industry. Ukraine's EW was notably effective at jamming Russian tactical radio communications and disrupting Russian drone control links.

Why didn't Russia's superior EW capability decide the war in its favor?

Russia's EW advantage was real but insufficient for several reasons: Ukraine adapted rapidly to jamming by adopting alternative communication systems (Starlink, encrypted UHF), precision weapon guidance was improved to reduce GPS jamming impact, Ukraine's own EW targeted and destroyed Russian EW assets, and Russia failed to integrate its EW capability effectively with other combat arms at the tactical level, particularly in the early phase of the war when EW planning was centralized and inflexible.

Sources

1. Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), Preliminary Lessons in Electronic Warfare from Russia's Invasion of Ukraine, 2022.
2. James Pearce, Center for Naval Analyses, assessment of Russian EW systems and operational use, 2023.
3. Bryan Clark and Dan Patt, Hudson Institute, Mosaic Warfare: Exploiting Artificial Intelligence and Autonomous Systems — EW degradation analysis, 2019, referenced for Ukraine comparison.
4. Ukrainian General Staff public statements on destruction of Russian EW systems, 2022–2024.
5. Breaking Defense, reporting on GPS jamming impacts on GMLRS and Western countermeasures, 2022–2023.