Communications Denial Battles in the Ukraine War

The capacity to communicate — between headquarters and subordinate units, between infantry and artillery, between air defense and aviation — is the nervous system of a modern military force. Disrupt that capacity, and coordination collapses: artillery fires blindly, reserves cannot be directed to critical points, retreats become routs. The Ukraine war produced sustained and sophisticated contests to deny communications to the adversary while maintaining one's own, creating a metacombat layer that ran continuously parallel to the kinetic battles on the ground. Both sides invested heavily in the technology and tactics of communications denial, with results that shaped the outcome of engagements from platoon to army level.

Russian Jamming of Ukrainian Tactical Radios

Russian tactical electronic warfare systems — most notably the Borisoglebsk-2 and the Leer-3 systems — were designed and deployed specifically to jam VHF and UHF radio communications used by Ukrainian combat units at the company, battalion, and brigade level. These are the tactical radios controlling artillery fire, directing infantry assaults, and maintaining the command authority without which decentralized combat operations disintegrate. Jamming them was among the highest-priority Russian EW tasks from the beginning of the campaign.

The Borisoglebsk-2 is a mobile jamming platform capable of disrupting communications in the 1.5–2,000 MHz frequency range, covering everything from HF through low UHF. Multiple units were deployed along the Donbas front by summer 2022, creating zones of communications degradation that Ukrainian tactical units learned to map and route around. Ukrainian after-action reports repeatedly noted periods of radio silence imposed by Russian jamming during attacks — particularly Russian offensive approaches — where the jamming was intended to blind the defender's fire control network during the critical approach phase.

The impact was real but not decisive. Ukrainian tactical units adapted by maintaining overlapping communications means: both VHF tactical radios and commercial encrypted apps over 4G LTE cellular networks (where coverage existed), Motorola encrypted handhelds, and the Starlink-enabled military communications package. When Russian jamming degraded VHF radios, units switched to alternative means. Russian jamming effectively degraded Ukrainian communications in the jamming zone rather than eliminating them entirely, and the cost efficiency calculation shifted as Ukraine improved communication redundancy.

Starlink as Resilient Communications Lifeline

The deployment of SpaceX Starlink terminals to Ukrainian forces beginning in late February 2022 represented a strategic communications breakthrough. Starlink, a low-Earth-orbit (LEO) satellite internet constellation, provided high-bandwidth broadband internet access using a frequencies in the Ku and Ka bands well above the range of most tactical EW jamming systems designed for military radio frequencies. Ukrainian units with Starlink terminals could maintain encrypted voice and data communications via applications like Signal and WhatsApp, share targeting information via military applications, stream drone video to tactical headquarters, and maintain connectivity with national command authorities even when ground-based infrastructure was destroyed or jammed.

Russia recognized Starlink's strategic importance immediately and attempted multiple countermeasures. Russian ground-based jamming of the Starlink terminal uplinks (the signal from the terminal to the satellite) achieved periodic localized disruptions. SpaceX responded with rapid software updates that enhanced anti-jam capability in the link, and the frequency-agile nature of the Starlink waveform made sustained jamming difficult. Russia also targeted Starlink terminals by geolocation — direction-finding the terminal's uplink transmissions and firing artillery at the located position — making terminal security procedures (concealment, short transmission windows) a critical operational skill for Ukrainian users.

Ukrainian EW Targeting Russian HF/VHF Communications

Ukraine's offensive use of electronic warfare against Russian communications was a significant but less publicly discussed dimension of the conflict. Ukrainian EW teams equipped with signals intelligence receivers and direction-finding systems hunted Russian tactical communications across the HF and VHF bands, serving two functions: providing intelligence from signals interception and enabling physical destruction of identified transmitters and their operators.

Russian tactical communications discipline was notoriously poor, particularly in the early months of the war. Russian unit commanders made tactical radio transmissions without encryption, discussed locations and plans over cellular telephones, and failed to rotate frequencies to defeat direction-finding. Ukrainian SIGINT teams intercepted these transmissions for intelligence, identified command post locations from radio direction-finding, and forwarded coordinates to artillery for immediate suppression. Multiple Russian battalion and regiment commanders were killed in the early weeks of the war through precisely this cycle — intercept, locate, strike.

Impact of Communications Blackouts on Unit Coordination

The operational consequences of communications blackouts were most severe at the platoon and company level, where the absence of radio contact with artillery or adjacent units for even short periods could allow an attacking force to exploit a gap without timely fire response. Ukrainian tactical units noted in after-action reports that Russian jamming was most consistently applied immediately before and during Russian assaults — coinciding with the moment when Ukrainian defenders most needed to call for fire. This deliberate synchronization of jamming with assault made Russian EW a genuine tactical effect rather than merely background interference.

Russian forces experienced their own communications blackouts — imposed by Ukrainian EW and physical strikes on command posts — particularly in the fast-moving early weeks when coordination failures were evident in multiple sectors. The January 2023 Makiivka HIMARS strike that killed over 80 Russian servicemen was enabled in part by Russian soldiers' cellular phone use that betrayed the position. Communications indiscipline persisted on both sides but was systematically more severe on the Russian side through much of the conflict, particularly among mobilized and irregular units.

Countermeasures: Building Resilient Communications

Both sides responded to communications jamming by building redundancy — multiple communication means for every critical link, so that jamming one did not eliminate the capability. Ukrainian forces became notably proficient at maintaining three or four parallel communication paths for key functions: artillery fire requests used VHF radio plus Starlink-enabled apps plus commercial mobile phones where network coverage existed, with a physical messenger available as last resort. This redundancy imposed overhead on communications management but ensured that Russian jamming, even when partially effective, did not impose the complete communication blackout that Russian tactical doctrine envisioned.

FAQ

Why couldn't Russia simply jam Starlink?

Starlink operates in Ku and Ka satellite bands using a frequency-agile waveform and has terminals that communicate with multiple satellites simultaneously. Jamming it effectively requires high-power transmitters covering a wide frequency range across the uplink and downlink bands, and doing so consistently within the terminal-to-satellite path geometry is operationally complex. SpaceX applied anti-jam upgrades rapidly in response to Russian jamming attempts. The cost and technical complexity of effective Starlink jamming significantly exceeded what Russian tactical EW systems were designed for.

How did Ukrainian direction-finding contribute to Russian command post losses?

Ukrainian SIGINT teams identified Russian radio transmissions, applied triangulation from multiple listening posts, and resolved command post positions to within tens to hundreds of metres. This position was then transmitted to artillery as a target. The process took minutes with experienced SIGINT teams, fast enough that commanders who transmitted regularly and did not move positions frequently were located and struck. The kill-chain was: intercept → locate → fire mission → impact, taking 5–20 minutes for responsive artillery.

Did Ukraine use cellular networks for military communications?

Yes. Ukrainian soldiers widely used commercial smartphones with encrypted applications (Signal, WhatsApp, Telegram) over Ukraine's 4G LTE cellular networks, which remained partially operational even in some combat areas due to the infrastructure resilience and repair effort of Ukrainian telecom operators. This created both a security risk — cell phone use could be geolocated by Russian EW systems — and a capability advantage — providing high-bandwidth data communication unavailable to most Russian tactical units. Ukrainian forces were trained on cell phone security protocols; Russian forces were notably less disciplined, contributing to intelligence losses and physical targeting.

What is the Leer-3 system and how was it used?

The Leer-3 is a Russian EW system that uses a drone (ZALA 421-16E UAV) to carry a jamming payload over the target area, providing communications jamming from closer range and at altitude over Ukrainian positions. It is principally designed to jam GSM cellular networks in the 900 MHz band, disrupting mobile phone communications used by Ukrainian forces. Several Leer-3 systems were identified and reportedly destroyed by Ukrainian forces, and the Ukrainian response included prioritizing Starlink over cellular for critical communications in frontline areas where Leer-3 operations were identified.

How important was communications superiority to the outcome of specific battles?

Communications superiority was closely correlated with tactical success in multiple documented engagements. The Kharkiv counteroffensive of September 2022, broadly assessed as Ukraine's most successful operation, was characterized by excellent Ukrainian communications discipline and degraded Russian communications due to the rapid movement disrupting Russian command networks. Conversely, the Zaporizhzhia offensive of 2023, which made slower progress, was conducted against intact Russian communications and defensive networks with superior Russian EW coverage in that sector.

Sources

1. Jack Watling and Nick Reynolds, RUSI, Ukraine at War: Paving the Road from Survival to Victory, 2022.
2. Ewen MacAskill and Helena Cobban, Guardian reporting on Starlink in Ukraine and Russian jamming responses, 2022–2023.
3. Mark Cancian, CSIS, analysis of Russian EW systems and operational performance in Ukraine, 2023.
4. Ukrainian telecommunications regulatory authority reports on civilian network damage and repair, 2022–2024.
5. Recorded Future, open-source intelligence analysis of Russian electronic warfare activity 2022–2024.