Phase 1: March–October 2022 — ATGM Dominance

• The initial Russian armoured thrust toward Kyiv (24 Feb – early April 2022) featured massive Russian losses from Ukrainian Javelin ATGMs, NLAWs, RPGs, and Stugna-P; Russian column tactics with tanks advancing on roads without infantry clearance proved catastrophic
• Kyiv area Russian losses: ~300+ tanks and AFVs confirmed destroyed in the thrust toward Kyiv; the combination of Ukrainian ambushes, poor Russian combined-arms coordination, and abundance of Western ATGM transfers produced a dramatic result
• Key lesson from Phase 1: tanks operating without infantry support, in unsuitable terrain (road columns in wooded areas), against defenders armed with modern ATGMs — die quickly. This was not new doctrine but a demonstration of what happens when Soviet-era practices meet modern anti-armour weapons at scale
• The myth of "the tank is obsolete" emerged from Phase 1 media coverage — premature and incorrect, as subsequent phases demonstrated

Phase 2: Late 2022 — Manoeuvre Returns

• Ukraine's September 2022 Kharkiv counteroffensive showed tanks remain decisive when employed correctly: Ukrainian T-64s and T-72s advanced rapidly across open steppe with poor Russian defenders; nearly 6,000 sq km retaken in days
• The Kherson counteroffensive further demonstrated that armoured mass, properly supported, can achieve rapid operational results; Russian defenders lacking depth and supporting artillery were overrun
• Phase 2 lesson: the problem in Phase 1 was not tanks per se but Russian tactical employment; properly coordinated combined-arms teams with tanks playing their intended role (protected direct fire, exploitation of breakthroughs with mobility) remained highly effective
• Drone use in Phase 2 was increasing but not yet the dominant factor it would become in 2023+; in open steppe terrain with dispersed operations, drone density was lower than in the dense Donbas trench warfare environment

Phase 3: 2023 — Western MBTs and the Drone Challenge

• First Western MBT deliveries: ~14 Challenger 2 (UK, from Jan 2023), ~90 Leopard 2A4/A5/A6 (Germany + other EU, from spring 2023), ~31 M1A1 Abrams (US, delivered by autumn 2023)
• Ukraine's June–September 2023 counteroffensive deployed Western MBTs and suffered significant losses: several Leopard 2A4s and Challengers were destroyed by mines, Lancet drones, and Kornet ATGMs in the initial breakthrough attempts against Russian fortification belts
• Analysis of Western MBT losses: the majority of Leopard 2 losses occurred in minefields and from top-attack drones (Lancet) and FPV drones — threats the tanks' thick frontal armour does not address; no Western MBT was confirmed destroyed by a Russian tank gun in a direct gun engagement
• The counteroffensive experience prompted significant tactical adaptation: Western MBTs began operating more cautiously with better engineer support and drone screening before advancing

Western MBT Performance Assessment

The Drone-Tank Dynamic

The drone threat to tanks is real but has been somewhat misrepresented in media coverage:

• FPV drones: Most effective against exposed tank crew (open hatches), vision blocks, engine decks, and tracks — causing mobility kills rather than catastrophic kills of the crew compartment on modern MBTs with composite armour; older T-64/T-72 are more vulnerable throughout
• Lancet loitering munition: Specifically designed for top-attack on armoured vehicles; most lethal Russian anti-tank drone system; demonstrated capability to destroy modern tanks from above where armour is thinner; 3kg shaped-charge warhead effective against most current ERA top-attack configurations
• Drone reconnaissance: Perhaps the most significant drone impact on armour is observation, not direct engagement; tanks cannot make surprise approach moves or massing manoeuvres without being observed; this fundamentally changes tactical options rather than simply destroying tanks
• Total confirmed tank losses in the war (both sides combined, Oryx methodology): 1,000+ Russian tanks + armoured vehicles; 400+ Ukrainian tanks + armoured vehicles (through OSINT-confirmed imagery)

Tank Countermeasures Evolution

• Cope cage / anti-drone cage: Slat armour or metal bar cage frames welded onto turret tops and engine decks; deflects FPV shaped-charge warheads by detonating them before reaching the armour; effective against many FPV warheads, less so against Lancet heavier shaped charges; almost universal on Ukrainian and Russian tanks by 2024
• ERA (Explosive Reactive Armour) evolution: Kontakt-5 all-around; Ukrainian development of Nozh (knife) ERA; integration of hard-kill APS on some vehicles
• Electronic countermeasure (ECM) systems: Russian "Arena-M" or similar electronic systems; Ukrainian vehicles increasingly fitted with GPS/navigation jammers and drone RF jammers; some tanks fitted with dedicated anti-FPV electronic systems disrupting the drone's video link or control frequency
• Smoke and concealment: Thermal smoke generators; camouflage netting on stationary tanks; reduced signature measures when moving
• Tactical changes: Fire and displace (never stationary after firing); use of covered approaches; avoiding open terrain without drone suppression; moving at night when thermal drone coverage is reduced

Tank Role in 2026

• By 2026 tanks remain essential to both sides' operations; no major offensive action has been conducted without armoured support; the tank's combination of firepower, protection, and mobility has not been replicated by any other system
• Tank role has adapted: less "charging spearhead," more careful "supporting arm" — providing direct fire support at range, enabling infantry advances by suppressing defensive positions, exploiting local breakthroughs in support of infantry rather than leading them
• Russian tank losses have been enormous (estimated 1,500+ tanks destroyed or captured over the war's duration); Russia has compensated by drawing from Soviet-era storage (T-62, T-55 reactivated) and accelerating T-90M production; these replacement tanks are qualitatively inferior to the vanguard T-80s and T-90s lost in 2022
• Ukraine's tank fleet is now a mix of upgraded T-64BV, T-72-series, captured Russian vehicles, Western MBTs (Leopard 2, Challenger 2, M1A1); maintaining this diverse fleet is logistically challenging but manageable
• The Ukraine war has definitively answered the post-Cold War debate about tank relevance: tanks remain indispensable in high-intensity combined-arms warfare; what has changed is the sophistication of their employment requirements

Frequently Asked Questions