Post-Liberation Security Challenges

Liberation of territory from Russian occupation requires transitioning rapidly from conventional military operations to stabilization and security provision—a transition historically among the most difficult in armed conflict management. Ukrainian authorities have confronted five major post-liberation security challenges that recur across liberated territories: explosive hazard contamination, collaborator and Russian agent networks within the civilian population, reconstruction of local law enforcement gutted by occupation, rebuilding the SBU's territorial presence, and navigating international offers of gendarmerie and security assistance missions. This article examines each challenge with reference to the Kharkiv, Kherson, and smaller liberated area case studies.

Explosive Hazard Contamination

Ukraine has become the most heavily mined country on Earth, according to the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS). Estimated contamination covers 174,000 km²—an area roughly the size of England—with mine and unexploded ordnance (UXO) density particularly high in liberated areas where front lines moved through settlements. Russian forces employed anti-personnel mines (largely prohibited under the Ottawa Treaty which Russia did not sign), anti-tank mines, booby traps, and improvised explosive devices systematically during tactical withdrawals—both to slow Ukrainian advances and to impose post-liberation cost. HALO Trust, Ukraine's State Emergency Service (DSNS), and approximately 40 international demining organizations are collectively the first priority security responder in any liberated area because no civilian activity is safe without initial route and area clearance. Demining is simultaneously the most time-consuming security task: at current clearance rates, full Ukraine demining will require decades and hundreds of billions in funding.

Russian and Collaborator Networks in the Population

Russian intelligence services (FSB, GRU) spent years developing agent networks in eastern and southern Ukraine before 2022, including in areas they intended to occupy. Within occupied territories, GRU and FSB services further recruited local collaborators, informants, and auxiliary agents from among the remaining population. After liberation, these networks constitute a persistent security threat: agents can provide targeting information for Russian artillery and missiles against rebuilt infrastructure, administrative offices, and returning civilian population. The SBU has documented numerous cases where initially undetected collaborator-agents provided targeting data for high-precision Russian strikes on recently liberated areas. Identifying and neutralizing these networks while avoiding mass false accusation—which drives innocent residents toward Russia-sympathetic sentiment—is one of the most difficult counterintelligence challenges of the post-liberation environment.

Security Threat Assessment Table

Rebuilding Local Police

Russian occupiers systematically replaced Ukrainian police with occupation-aligned security structures—creating Russian-compliant "police" forces staffed by a mix of imported Russian officers, collaborating Ukrainians, and conscripted locals. After liberation, Ukrainian National Police forces must reconstitute local presence from essentially zero in the worst-affected areas. This requires: rapid deployment of police from unaffected regions to provide immediate presence; vetting of any former Ukrainian officers who remained through occupation; recruitment and training of new local officers; and restoring the physical infrastructure of police stations (many destroyed or occupied and repurposed). EU Advisory Mission Ukraine (EUAM) provides advisory support for police reform and post-liberation reconstitution, including specific programs for liberated oblast police forces with German, French, and Scandinavian expertise.

SBU Capacity and Counterintelligence

The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) suffered significant pre-war penetration by Russian intelligence—documented in high-profile collaboration cases in early 2022, including SBU officers who provided targeting intelligence to Russia. President Zelensky's leadership reform of the SBU, including dismissal of the original director Ivan Bakanov in mid-2022 and replacement by Vasyl Malyuk, initiated a significant internal cleanse. Post-liberation SBU operations in Kharkiv and Kherson oblasts demonstrated improved operational security but highlighted capacity constraints: the number of trained counterintelligence officers is finite, and the scale of potential agent networks in some occupied territories may exceed SBU's ability to investigate thoroughly. International partners provide SIGINT-assisted counterintelligence support (not publicly acknowledged in detail) that supplements SBU organic capabilities.

FAQ

How long does mine clearance take in liberated areas?

Timeline estimates vary dramatically by contamination density and available clearance capacity. Priority routes and inhabited areas typically receive clearance within weeks to months. Agricultural land—essential for economic recovery—takes years. Full clearance of Ukrainian territory at current rates is estimated at 15-25 years by UNMAS. Machine clearance systems (used by HALO Trust and others) accelerate open-area clearance but are ineffective in built environments where manual clearance remains necessary. The EU-funded Ukraine demining center in Kyiv is intended to accelerate training of additional deminers.

What is the role of international gendarmerie missions in post-liberation security?

Several EU member states with deployable gendarmerie or carabinieri forces have discussed contributing to post-liberation stabilization missions. France's Gendarmerie nationale and Italy's Carabinieri have both been mooted for potential missions, particularly under EUAM Ukraine frameworks. As of early 2026, no formal armed international constabulary mission operates in direct post-liberation zones, though civilian EU advisory mission personnel provide non-armed support. Any armed international mission would require specific Ukrainian government request, UN mandate or EU decision authority, and negotiated status-of-forces agreements.

How does Ukraine handle Russian citizens found in liberated areas?

Russian military personnel found in liberated areas are treated as prisoners of war under the Third Geneva Convention if captured during active military operations. Russian civilians found in liberated areas (such as individuals who relocated from Russia to occupied territories during occupation) are subject to Ukrainian immigration and national security law. Ukrainian legal authority over previously occupied territories is fully asserted, meaning Russian administrative acts during occupation (property registrations, identity documents, marriages contracted under occupation law) are not recognized by Ukrainian legal structures and must be regularized under Ukrainian law.

What is the EUAM Ukraine mission and what has it accomplished?

The EU Advisory Mission Ukraine (EUAM Ukraine) was established in 2014 as a civilian advisory mission to support reform of the Ukrainian civilian security sector (police, prosecution, SBU). After the full-scale invasion, its mandate was adjusted to include advisory support for post-liberation areas. EUAM has helped develop training programs for police forces in liberated oblasts, supported prosecution system development for war crimes investigations, and advised on community policing models. Its advisory (non-executive) mandate limits its ability to directly operate security functions, but its institutional capacity-building role is considered significant by Ukrainian partners.

Is collaborator prosecution creating public order problems?

Collaboration cases have generated social tension in some liberated communities, where different residents may hold sharply divergent views of who cooperated voluntarily versus under coercion. Ukrainian legal processes have generally proceeded deliberately rather than via mass summary proceedings, which reduces arbitrary injustice but delays closure. Human rights organizations have noted concerns about detention conditions for some suspects, proportionality in some charges, and access to defense counsel—issues that Ukrainian authorities acknowledge and partially attribute to overwhelmed judicial system capacity in wartime.

Sources

1. UNMAS Ukraine, Ukraine Explosive Hazard Assessment, United Nations Mine Action Service, 2024.
2. EUAM Ukraine, Annual Progress Report, European Union Advisory Mission Ukraine, 2024.
3. HALO Trust, Ukraine Demining Operations Report, The HALO Trust, 2024.
4. Human Rights Watch, Post-Liberation Human Rights Monitoring in Kharkiv and Kherson, HRW, 2023.
5. SBU (Security Service of Ukraine), Counterintelligence Operations in Liberated Territories, public reporting aggregated, 2022–2024.