Origins of the DPRK-Russia Military Alliance

The North Korea-Russia military partnership predates the Kursk deployment, rooted in the Soviet-era relationship between Moscow and Pyongyang that survived the Cold War's end. However, Russia's international isolation following its 2022 invasion of Ukraine created a sudden political opening for deeper ties with one of the world's few remaining states willing to align openly with Moscow.

Key milestones:

• September 2023: Kim Jong-un made his first foreign trip in years, traveling by armored train to Russia's Vostochny Cosmodrome for a summit with Putin. Arms supply discussions began in earnest.
• Late 2023: First significant artillery shell deliveries — North Korean 152mm rounds — begin reaching Russian forces in Ukraine
• June 2024: Putin visits Pyongyang. A "Comprehensive Strategic Partnership Treaty" is signed, with mutual defense provisions reminiscent of Cold War pacts
• October 2024: First confirmed North Korean troop deployments to Kursk Oblast, initially denied then confirmed by Moscow
• 2025: Deployments expand; North Korea becomes Russia's largest single source of artillery ammunition

North Korean Weapons Supply: Artillery, Missiles, and More

North Korea's military industry, developed over decades under international isolation, has proven surprisingly capable of supplying Russia's wartime needs.

Artillery Ammunition: The Critical Contribution

Russia's most acute logistics problem through 2023–2024 was the shortage of 152mm artillery shells. North Korea stepped into this gap with mass supplies, estimated at:

• 3–5 million 152mm artillery shells supplied by end of 2025
• 122mm rockets for BM-21 Grad multiple launch rocket systems
• Mortar rounds in various calibers

Ukrainian forces reported increases in Russian artillery fire rates in late 2023 that correlated with North Korean ammunition deliveries — providing real battlefield evidence of the supply chain's impact.

Ballistic Missiles

Russia has used modified versions of North Korean KN-23 and KN-24 short-range ballistic missiles in strikes against Ukrainian cities. These weapons, with ranges of 400–700 km, have been used alongside Russian Iskander missiles. Their accuracy is lower than Russian systems, but they supplement Russia's stockpile and complicate Ukrainian air defense.

Other Weapons Systems

• M-2018 self-propelled howitzers (Koksan variant)
• Infantry weapons, body armor, and military equipment
• Potentially: components for drone production

Troop Deployment to Kursk Oblast

The deployment of North Korean soldiers to Russian territory — and subsequently to active combat areas — followed a sequence confirmed by Ukrainian, US, South Korean, and ultimately Russian official sources:

Initial Deployment (October 2024)

The first contingent of approximately 3,000 North Korean troops arrived at Russian training facilities in the Far East in September–October 2024. They underwent brief acclimatization training and were issued Russian military equipment — including uniforms — reportedly to obscure their nationality.

Expansion (November–December 2024)

Deployments grew to an estimated 10,000–12,000 personnel by December 2024. Units were composed primarily of infantry assault troops from elite KPA units, together with artillery operators and logistics personnel.

Combat Employment

North Korean troops were employed in Kursk Oblast in infantry assault roles, alongside Russian forces attempting to push back Ukraine's incursion. They operated in company and battalion-sized formations under Russian operational command but with KPA officers commanding their own units tactically.

Related: Kursk Operation: Timeline and Outcome

Combat Performance: Learning Modern Warfare the Hard Way

North Korean troops' performance in Kursk was closely monitored by Western and South Korean intelligence, providing the most valuable real-world assessment of KPA capabilities since the Korean War armistice.

Major Weaknesses Identified

• Drone blindness: KPA soldiers had no training or doctrine for dealing with FPV kamikaze drones. Entire assault formations were devastated by small groups of Ukrainian drone operators before North Korean commanders understood the threat.
• Rigid tactical doctrine: North Korean troops operated in large formations with limited individual initiative, making them highly vulnerable to dispersed Ukrainian defenses and precise artillery fire
• Communications incompatibility: Initial units used North Korean communications gear incompatible with Russian systems, causing serious coordination failures
• Navigation challenges: GPS jamming environments and unfamiliar terrain presented serious difficulties for troops accustomed to training on Korean peninsula geography
• Language barrier: Language differences complicated integration with Russian units at the tactical level

Adaptations Over Time

Later-deploying North Korean units showed improvements: they were issued Russian communications gear, received brief drone-awareness training, and altered their assault tactics. However, fundamental doctrinal rigidity remained a persistent problem.

What North Korea Learned

Despite suffering heavy casualties, the KPA gained irreplaceable experience:

• First-hand observation of modern drone warfare, electronic warfare, and precision artillery
• Hands-on experience with Russian advanced weapons including T-90 tanks, Su-57 aircraft operations, and modern EW systems
• Large-scale logistics experience in modern combined-arms operations
• Identification of critical KPA capability gaps that will inform future training and procurement

North Korean Casualties

North Korean forces suffered severe casualties in Kursk Oblast. Ukrainian military intelligence (HUR) and South Korean sources provided ongoing casualty assessments:

• Estimated killed: 2,000–4,000
• Estimated wounded: 3,000–6,000
• Captured: at least 2 confirmed prisoners publicly identified; possibly dozens more
• Overall loss rate: approximately 30–40% of deployed force

Several North Korean soldiers captured by Ukraine were brought before cameras and reportedly expressed shock at the nature of modern warfare. Bodies of North Korean soldiers confirmed the deployment through distinctive physical characteristics, equipment, and documents.

Russia reportedly returned remains secretly and paid compensation to North Korean families — the terms of which are classified but reportedly involve continued economic support to Pyongyang.

What North Korea Receives from Russia

The alliance is transactional. North Korea's compensation reportedly includes:

Financial and Economic Support

• Cash payments estimated at $2.5–5 billion annually for weapons and troop deployment
• Russian oil and petroleum products at below-market prices, partially circumventing international sanctions
• Food aid supporting a North Korean population facing chronic food insecurity
• Access to Russian markets for North Korean labor

Military Technology

• Russian satellite reconnaissance capabilities and data sharing
• Reportedly: assistance with North Korea's spy satellite program (DPRK launched multiple reconnaissance satellites in 2023–2025 with suspected Russian technical support)
• Anti-aircraft missile technologies to modernize North Korea's air defenses
• Submarine propulsion technologies — a long-sought North Korean goal
• Hypersonic missile technology sharing (unconfirmed but assessed likely)

Strategic Positioning

• Russian diplomatic cover at the UN Security Council (vetoing resolutions targeting North Korea)
• Enhanced international visibility and legitimacy by having a permanent UN Security Council member as an open ally

Military Technology Transfer: The Longer-Term Concern

For Western analysts and Asian security partners — particularly South Korea, Japan, and the United States — the most alarming aspect of the DPRK-Russia partnership is not troops in Kursk but technology transfers that could permanently enhance North Korea's military capabilities.

North Korea entering the war with Russia has potentially accelerated its:

• Reconnaissance satellite capability: Multiple DPRK satellites launched 2023–2025 give Kim Kim real-time imagery of South Korean and US military installations
• Submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) program: Russian submarine technology assistance could make the DPRK's nuclear second-strike capability credible
• Hypersonic missile development
• Tactical nuclear weapons miniaturization — a stated DPRK priority that Russia could assist with components or expertise

South Korea, Japan, and the US have assessed this technology transfer risk as among the most serious strategic consequences of the Russia-DPRK partnership.

International Reaction

South Korea

Seoul reacted with particular concern and, for the first time since the Cold War, began actively discussing sending lethal aid to Ukraine. South Korea had previously limited itself to non-lethal support due to fears of Russian counter-escalation. The DPRK troop deployment effectively removed Russian leverage over South Korean policy, leading to initial deliveries of 155mm artillery ammunition to Ukraine in early 2025.

Japan

Japan expanded its defensive support to Ukraine and further consolidated its intelligence-sharing arrangement with NATO partners, particularly regarding North Korean military capabilities revealed by the Kursk deployment.

United States

The US designated Russia and North Korea as engaged in a formal military alliance, imposed new sanctions on North Korean weapons trade entities, and used the DPRK deployment as a counterargument to those advocating US disengagement from Ukraine — arguing it demonstrated Russia's creation of a destabilizing axis with authoritarian states.

China

China expressed quiet displeasure at the DPRK-Russia military integration, which complicates Beijing's preferred role as sole patron of North Korea. China does not want North Korea developing independent military relationships that bypass Chinese leverage, nor Russian-supplied military technology in North Korea. However, Beijing has not publicly condemned the partnership.

Strategic Implications: A New Authoritarian Axis?

The Russia-North Korea military partnership is part of a broader alignment between authoritarian states challenging the rules-based international order:

• Russia and North Korea (troops, ammunition, technology sharing)
• Russia and Iran (Shahed drones, ballistic missiles, technology)
• Russia and China (economic lifeline, technology, diplomatic cover)
• Connections between Iran, North Korea, and Venezuela in weapons and expertise networks

Western analysts increasingly describe this as an "axis of resistance to the Western-led order" — not a formal alliance, but a network of mutual support among states facing Western sanctions, confrontation, or isolation.

The Ukraine war has functioned as a catalyst, accelerating existing alignments and creating new ones at a pace that surprised Western policy planners.

Related: Trump-Zelensky Relations 2026 | 3 Years of War: Key Lessons

Frequently Asked Questions