Domestic Support Resilience in Ukraine: Public Opinion Over Four Years of War

Among the many factors that have shaped the outcome of Russia's war against Ukraine, one of the most underanalyzed and consequential has been the resilience of Ukrainian domestic public support. Multiple waves of polling by the Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS), Rating Group, and international partners have documented how Ukrainian society has sustained extraordinary levels of support for the war effort since February 2022, even as cumulative physical destruction, casualties, energy shortages, and economic hardship have taken a serious toll on daily life. The durability of this support — often surprising to Western observers accustomed to measuring public opinion against peacetime standards — has been a genuine strategic asset.

Baseline: The Unity of Shock and Solidarity

In March 2022, immediately after the Russian invasion, polling by KIIS showed an astonishing 82% of Ukrainians believed Ukraine would win the war. Support for continuing to fight rather than making territorial concessions exceeded 80% across all regions sampled — including in the east and south, areas where pre-war surveys had shown more ambivalence about political orientation. The immediate experience of invasion — of missiles striking housing blocs, of refugees fleeing, of Russian forces committing atrocities in Bucha and Irpin — appears to have generated a crystallizing effect on Ukrainian national identity, transforming pre-existing ambivalences into more unified positions.

President Zelensky's decision to remain in Kyiv rather than evacuate — "I need ammunition, not a ride" — became a defining moment whose impact on domestic morale was measurable in polling conducted within days. His approval rating rose from approximately 30% pre-invasion to over 90% within a week, and remained above 70% through the end of 2023.

Sustaining Support: Key Trend Data 2022–2025

The more analytically interesting question is not whether initial solidarity was high — all countries show patriotic consolidation in the immediate wake of attack — but how that support has been sustained over four years of grinding attrition warfare. KIIS quarterly tracking surveys provide the most consistent longitudinal data. The key finding is that while support has moderated from its shock-phase peak, it has remained remarkably high by comparative historical standards.

Willingness to "continue fighting until victory" stood at 77% in October 2022, declined to approximately 65% by late 2023 as the counteroffensive underperformed, recovered slightly to 68–70% in 2024 following battlefield stabilization, and as of late 2025 tracked at approximately 62–65%. Even at this lower bound, the figure represents majority support for continuing an extraordinarily costly war — well above the levels that contributed to war-ending public pressure in comparable historical instances.

Confidence in Zelensky: Rise, Decline, and Stabilization

President Zelensky's approval trajectory illustrates both the strength and the limits of war-consolidation effects. After peaking above 90% in March 2022, his approval declined through 2024 primarily driven by mobilization policy friction, the perceived inadequacy of the 2023 counteroffensive, and growing frustration with corruption allegations within the Ministry of Defense that resulted in large-scale dismissals in mid-2023. By early 2025, Zelensky's approval stood at approximately 55–60% in most surveys — still majority positive, but no longer the near-consensus of the war's first year.

Importantly, declining approval for Zelensky did not translate directly into declining support for the war itself: polling consistently showed that Ukrainians could simultaneously criticize government performance while maintaining support for the war effort. This distinction — between support for the leadership versus support for the national objective — is analytically significant and suggests the war has taken on a meaning that transcends individual leadership personalities.

Regional Variations in Support

Ukraine's pre-war regional political geography was well-documented — with the west predominantly Ukrainian-speaking, nationalist, and EU-oriented, and the east and south more Russian-speaking and having historically divided political loyalties. The war has modified but not entirely erased these regional patterns. Support for continuing to fight is consistently highest in western and central Ukraine (75–85%) and somewhat lower in the east and south (55–70% in accessible regions, acknowledging that occupied territories cannot be surveyed).

However, the regional convergence effect is the striking finding: the gap between the most supportive and least supportive regions narrowed significantly compared to pre-war political divisions. The direct experience of Russian occupation, even among Russian-speaking populations in Kherson and Kharkiv oblasts, appears to have generated strong anti-Russian sentiment that translated into support for Ukrainian resistance, even among demographic groups with historically more complex relationships to Russian cultural identity.

Societal Resilience Mechanisms

Analysts studying why Ukrainian support has remained higher than comparative cases highlight several mechanisms. First, collective victimhood: the war has been distinctly civilian-affecting, with Russian strikes on residential infrastructure, schools, maternity hospitals, and energy systems creating a shared experience of suffering that has sustained solidarity. Second, the role of civil society: Ukraine's vibrant volunteer networks — which existed before 2022 and expanded enormously since — have provided a visible channel for active citizen participation in the war effort, sustaining agency and avoiding the passivity that can accelerate fatigue.

Third, information coherence: while Ukraine has certainly managed information about military setbacks carefully, the fundamental reality of continued war has not been deniable in the way it can be in societies where domestic territory is not under direct attack. Every Ukrainian family has someone at the front, someone who has fled, or someone displaced — making the stakes personally immediate in a way that sustains engagement that cannot be sustained through information management alone.

Risks and Trajectories

Looking forward, analysts identify several potential vectors for support erosion. Prolonged mobilization pressure — particularly affecting young men and their families — is the most frequently cited pressure point. Energy insecurity through multiple winters has created chronic hardship. Economic disruption, internal displacement, and the demographic effects of emigration (over 6 million Ukrainians abroad by 2025) have reduced the domestic base from which support is measured. Any settlement framework that required formal recognition of territorial losses would likely generate significant polling declines, as the strength of public opposition to concessions remains a genuine political constraint on leadership decision-making.

Frequently Asked Questions

Q: What organization conducts the most reliable polls on Ukrainian public opinion?

A: The Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS) and Rating Group Ukraine are the two most widely cited Ukrainian polling organizations. KIIS in particular has maintained consistent survey methodologies across the war period, making longitudinal comparisons more reliable than cross-organization comparisons.

Q: How reliable is polling conducted during wartime in Ukraine?

A: Wartime polling faces challenges including inability to survey occupied territories, potential self-censorship on politically sensitive items, displacement of respondents, and differential non-response. Researchers generally note that these factors may cause support figures to be mildly overstated, but that the magnitude of reported support is too large to be entirely explained by methodological bias.

Q: Why did Ukrainian public confidence not collapse after the 2023 counteroffensive underperformed?

A: The counteroffensive's limited gains (roughly 500 km² recaptured) caused some decline in confidence but did not collapse public will, largely because Russian offensive success throughout 2023 was also limited — the stalemate was read as non-defeat rather than as decisive loss, preserving the credible hope of a better future outcome.

Q: What is the Trust in Armed Forces indicator and why is it high?

A: Ukrainian trust in the Armed Forces has been measured consistently above 85% throughout the war — an extraordinary figure in comparative survey research globally. It reflects direct observation of military effectiveness, personal connection (most families have military members), and the absence of significant domestic war crimes allegations against Ukrainian forces in independent investigations.

Q: How have eastern Ukrainian regions' views changed since occupation and liberation?

A: Surveys of liberated areas (Kherson city, parts of Kharkiv oblast) after Russian withdrawal have consistently shown stronger pro-Ukrainian sentiment than pre-war surveys of those areas, apparently reflecting the radicalizing effect of direct occupation experience even on previously more ambivalent populations.

Sources

• Kyiv International Institute of Sociology (KIIS), "Public Opinion in Ukraine" quarterly surveys (2022–2025)
• Rating Group Ukraine, national surveys on war attitudes (2022–2025)
• International Republican Institute (IRI), Ukraine public opinion surveys (2022–2024)
• Razumkov Centre, "Social and Political Mood" bulletin (quarterly, 2022–2025)
• USAID/Sociis, Ukraine conflict-related surveys (2022–2024)
• Pew Research Center, "Views of Ukraine in Ukraine" (2023)
• Fund for Peace, "Societal Resilience Indicators" analytical framework