The Defense Supply Chain Exposed by the Ukraine War
The war in Ukraine turned an obscure subject — the defense supply chain — into a strategic priority for every Western government. When artillery duels burned through shells faster than factories could make them, the bottleneck was rarely the visible weapon. It was the chemicals, powders and components hidden deep in the supply chain: nitrocellulose, TNT, RDX, semiconductors, rare-earth magnets and rocket motors. This hub maps those chokepoints, explains why munitions matter most, and links to detailed pages on each weak link and the reshoring effort now under way.
What a Supply Chain Is
A defense supply chain is the entire sequence of raw materials, chemicals, sub-components and factories that converge to produce a finished weapon. A single 155mm artillery shell — the war's defining munition — is the endpoint of a long industrial pipeline. It begins with cotton linters or wood pulp and concentrated nitric acid, runs through energetic nitrocellulose and explosive fills such as TNT and RDX, and only then reaches the forged steel body, the fuze and final load-assemble-pack.
Because each stage depends on the one before it, the chain produces at the pace of its slowest link. A factory that can fill a million empty shell bodies a year is useless if it can only obtain enough propellant powder for a fraction of that. This dependency is what made the supply chain, rather than the weapon design, the real constraint on Western support for Ukraine.
The lesson generalises beyond artillery. Missiles, air-defense interceptors, drones and armored vehicles all rest on the same deep tiers of energetic chemicals, electronics and specialty metals. When one of those tiers is thin, every system above it is exposed.
Tiered Suppliers
Defense industry analysts describe the supply chain in tiers. The "primes" — companies such as Rheinmetall, BAE Systems, Lockheed Martin and General Dynamics — sit at the top and deliver finished systems to governments. Below them, Tier 1 suppliers provide major sub-assemblies; Tier 2 and Tier 3 firms make components, sub-components and specialty inputs; and at the base sit the producers of raw energetic chemicals and critical minerals.
The danger lives in the lowest tiers. Primes are visible, profitable and easy to fund. The deep tiers — a single nitrocellulose line, one TNT source, a lone solid-rocket-motor caster — are capital-intensive, hazardous and were starved of orders for two decades. When demand surged after 2022, the primes could in principle scale, but they were strangled by sub-suppliers that could not.
This inverted-pyramid risk is why Western governments have begun funding the base of the chain directly, rather than simply ordering more finished weapons from the top.
The Chokepoints
Six chokepoints recurred in war-economy reporting between 2022 and 2026. First, propellant powder and energetic nitrocellulose, concentrated in very few plants. Second, military explosives — TNT, RDX and HMX — where North America had effectively no domestic TNT production for years. Third, semiconductors and electronics for guided weapons. Fourth, rare-earth magnets for motors and guidance. Fifth, gallium and germanium for radar and infrared sensors, subject to Chinese export controls. Sixth, solid rocket motors for missiles and rockets.
| Chokepoint | Why it binds | Detail page |
|---|---|---|
| 155mm shell pipeline | End product whose output is gated by deeper tiers | 155mm supply chain |
| Explosives (TNT, RDX, HMX) | Few plants; no domestic North American TNT for years | Explosives makers |
| Propellant & nitrocellulose | Hazardous chemistry concentrated in single sites | Propellant shortage |
| Semiconductors | Guided weapons depend on chips and electronics | Defense semiconductors |
| Rare earths, gallium, germanium | China dominates processing; export controls | Rare earths & minerals |
| Solid rocket motors | Thin casting capacity for missiles and rockets | Solid rocket motors |
⚠ The chokepoint list reflects recurring themes in war-economy reporting from the European Commission, US Army and outlets such as Reuters and Defense News; sub-pages carry the detailed, dated figures.
Why Munitions Matter Most
Of all the chokepoints, consumable munitions — above all the 155mm shell — proved the most strategically decisive. Ukraine and Russia have at times fired in a single day what a peacetime Western army might use in a year. Stockpiles built for short, intense conflicts drained within months, and replenishment depended entirely on production rates that had been allowed to wither.
That made shell capacity, and the powder and explosives that feed it, among the most valuable assets in European and American defense. The EU's headline aim was to push annual 155mm output toward roughly two million shells, while the US Army targeted around 100,000 rounds a month. Both goals depended less on metal-forging capacity than on energetic chemicals — the part of the chain that takes longest to rebuild.
Platforms such as tanks, jets and air-defense launchers matter too, but they are bought in the hundreds, not the millions, and their loss rates are far lower. It was the war of attrition in artillery and drones that turned munitions throughput into the single clearest measure of who could sustain the fight.
Reshoring and Onshoring
The Western response has been a wave of reshoring — moving critical production back inside national or allied borders and adding redundancy so no single disruption can halt output. In the United States, Repkon USA won a contract to build a TNT plant in Kentucky and General Dynamics committed its own capital to restart 155mm shell production in Texas. The Army opened new load-assemble-pack lines to lift monthly output.
In Europe, Eurenco restarted and expanded nitrocellulose and propellant production at Bergerac in France; Rheinmetall bought the German nitrocellulose maker Hagedorn-NC and moved to expand its Nitrochemie joint venture with RUAG in Switzerland and Germany; and Chemring Nobel grew explosives capacity in Norway with EU support. Parallel efforts target rare-earth magnets, gallium and germanium to reduce dependence on Chinese processing.
None of this is fast. Energetic-chemical plants and magnet supply chains take years to permit, build and certify, so the deepest constraints are expected to ease only gradually through the late 2020s. The strategic shift, though, is real: governments now treat the base of the supply chain as a matter of national security rather than ordinary procurement.
Explore the Sub-Pages
This hub links to detailed analyses of each chokepoint. The pages below carry the dated, sourced figures on production targets, plant capacities and contracts.
- The 155mm Artillery Shell Supply Chain — the full pipeline from powder to fuze.
- The World's Explosives Makers — TNT, RDX, HMX and the new plants.
- The Propellant Shortage — why powder, not steel, is the binding constraint.
- Semiconductors in Defense — chips for guided weapons.
- Rare Earths, Gallium and Germanium — critical minerals and export controls.
- Solid Rocket Motors — the missile-production chokepoint.
Frequently Asked Questions
What is a defense supply chain?
A defense supply chain is the full chain of raw materials, chemicals, components and factories that feed into a finished weapon. For a 155mm shell it runs from cotton or wood pulp and nitric acid, through nitrocellulose and explosives, to forged steel bodies, fuzes and final assembly. A shortage at any single tier can throttle the whole output, which is why the chain is only as fast as its slowest chokepoint.
What bottlenecks did the Ukraine war expose?
The war exposed acute shortages in propellant powder and nitrocellulose, military explosives such as TNT and RDX, semiconductors used in guided weapons, and critical minerals like gallium and germanium. It also revealed thin capacity in solid rocket motors. Years of low orders had left these deep tiers running near single sites with little slack.
Why is propellant the binding constraint, not the shell body?
Forging a steel shell body is relatively easy to scale because the skills and machinery exist in the wider metals industry. Making energetic nitrocellulose and propellant powder is a hazardous, specialised chemical process concentrated in a handful of plants. Western planners repeatedly found that powder and explosives, not metal parts, set the ceiling on how many complete rounds could be produced.
What is the EU ASAP program?
The Act in Support of Ammunition Production (ASAP), enacted in 2023, channelled about €500 million to expand European explosives, powder, shell and missile output. Its headline aim was to lift annual European 155mm production toward roughly two million shells. The EU said capacity reached about one million rounds a year in early 2025, with primes targeting 1.1 to 1.5 million by 2027.
How fast is US shell production growing?
US monthly 155mm output rose from roughly 14,500 shells before 2022 to around 40,000 in 2025. The Army's stated goal is about 100,000 rounds per month, originally targeted for October 2025 but now expected closer to mid-2026, alongside more than a million shells produced over the course of 2026.
Why does only one TNT source matter so much?
For years North America had no domestic TNT production and relied on imports, leaving a single point of failure for the main bursting charge in artillery shells. New plants, including a Repkon USA TNT facility in Kentucky and a General Dynamics project in Texas, aim to restore that capability, but standing up energetic-chemical plants takes years.
What are rare earths, gallium and germanium used for?
Rare-earth elements go into the permanent magnets in motors, actuators and precision-guidance systems, while gallium and germanium are used in radar, electronic-warfare and infrared sensors. China dominates the processing of these materials and imposed export controls on gallium and germanium, sharpening Western concern about dependence in defense electronics.
What is reshoring or onshoring of defense production?
Reshoring means moving critical production back inside national or allied borders rather than relying on distant or single-source suppliers. In defense it covers new explosives, propellant, shell and magnet plants in the US and Europe, plus efforts to second-source chips and minerals. The goal is resilience: enough redundancy that one disruption cannot halt munitions output.
Who are the key Western explosives and propellant makers?
Key names include BAE Systems' Holston plant in Tennessee (RDX and HMX), Eurenco in France (nitrocellulose and propellant), the Nitrochemie joint venture of Rheinmetall and RUAG in Switzerland and Germany, Chemring Nobel in Norway, and Repkon USA and General Dynamics for new TNT and shell capacity in the United States.
How long will it take to fix the bottlenecks?
Energetic-chemical plants and magnet supply chains take years to design, permit and certify, so most analysts expect the deepest constraints to ease only gradually through the late 2020s. Metal-parts and assembly capacity scaled faster, but powder, explosives and critical minerals remain the slow links that determine the realistic ceiling on output.