Uranium & Nuclear Fuel: Rosatom, Cameco, Urenco and Western Dependence on Russia

The Nuclear Fuel Cycle

Getting uranium from the ground into a reactor involves several distinct stages, and control is concentrated differently at each. First, uranium ore is mined and milled into "yellowcake". Next, it is converted into uranium hexafluoride gas. Then comes enrichment, which raises the share of the fissile isotope uranium-235 to reactor-grade levels — the most technically demanding and capital-intensive step, measured in separative work units (SWU). Finally, enriched uranium is fabricated into fuel assemblies tailored to specific reactor designs.

Mining is relatively diversified — Kazakhstan, Canada and Australia are leading sources — but enrichment is highly concentrated among a handful of suppliers. That concentration is the heart of the strategic problem: a country can have ample uranium ore yet still depend on a rival for the enrichment services that make it usable.

Russia, through Rosatom, is vertically integrated across the whole chain, and especially powerful in enrichment, conversion and fuel fabrication for Russian-designed reactors operating across Eastern Europe and beyond.

Rosatom's Enrichment Dominance

Rosatom is Russia's state atomic energy corporation, spanning uranium mining, conversion, enrichment, fuel fabrication, reactor construction and exports. Because it is state-owned and not exchange-listed, it has no market capitalization and publishes limited financial detail, so its global role is best assessed qualitatively through agency and industry reporting rather than market metrics.

On enrichment, analysts commonly estimate that Rosatom holds roughly a third of global capacity — figures around 35-40% are frequently cited — the single largest share of any supplier. The European consortium Urenco is usually placed next at about 30%, with France's Orano and Chinese producers accounting for much of the remainder. These shares vary by source and methodology, but the direction is consistent: Russia is the largest single enricher in the world.

That dominance gives Moscow strategic leverage and export revenue, which is precisely why nuclear fuel became such a sensitive issue after the invasion of Ukraine.

Why Western Dependence Persists

Unlike oil and gas, which can be re-sourced in months to a couple of years, enrichment cannot. Building new centrifuge capacity is a multi-year undertaking requiring sensitive technology, licensing and large capital. So even as Western governments condemned the war, utilities kept relying on Russian enrichment and fuel services because there was no fast alternative.

In the United States, Russia supplied roughly a quarter of the enrichment services used by reactors in recent years. Several European countries, especially those running Russian-designed VVER reactors, were even more exposed for fuel fabrication. The US responded by enacting a ban on imports of Russian low-enriched uranium, phased in toward the end of the decade with interim waivers, while channeling funding into expanding domestic enrichment.

The practical upshot is a managed, multi-year transition rather than a clean break — a striking contrast to the rapid shifts seen in fossil fuels.

Cameco, Urenco and the West's Options

Two non-Russian names anchor the Western fuel-supply response. Cameco (NYSE: CCJ, TSX: CCO) is a large Canadian uranium miner and fuel-services provider; its market capitalization reached roughly US$45 billion in mid-2026 amid rising uranium prices and supply-security demand. Urenco is the European enrichment consortium owned by UK, Dutch and German interests; it is not publicly listed, so it has no quoted market cap, but it is the most important non-Russian enricher and a focus of capacity-expansion plans alongside France's Orano.

⚠ Cameco's market cap is approximate, rounded and changes daily (source). Enrichment market shares are estimates that vary by source (RUSI source); Rosatom is state-owned and not listed. Not investment advice.

Risks and Outlook

The central question is how fast the West can rebuild enrichment capacity outside Russia. Urenco and Orano have announced expansions and US-backed projects aim to restore domestic enrichment, but new capacity takes years to license and commission. In the interim, some Russian supply or pre-purchased stockpiling is expected to bridge the gap, and any abrupt cutoff — by sanction or Russian retaliation — could disrupt fuel supply for affected utilities.

For uranium prices and miners such as Cameco, the supply-security narrative, a broader nuclear-energy revival and constrained mine supply have driven a strong multi-year rally. Those dynamics could persist if reactor build-out continues, but uranium is historically volatile and sensitive to sentiment.

The strategic lesson mirrors the rest of the war's energy story: dependence built over decades cannot be unwound overnight, and enrichment — quiet, technical and concentrated — turned out to be the West's stickiest tie to Russia.

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