North Korea's Munitions and Troops for Russia's War
North Korea has become one of Russia's most important wartime suppliers, sending Soviet-caliber artillery shells by the millions, short-range ballistic missiles, and tens of thousands of troops to fight in Russia's Kursk region. South Korean and Ukrainian intelligence have tracked thousands of containers crossing the border, underpinning estimates of more than twelve million 152mm rounds. The arrangement helped Russia sustain its artillery-heavy way of fighting at a critical moment. Every figure here is an intelligence estimate — opaque, contested, and framed qualitatively, with sources and as-of dates noted throughout.
152mm Artillery Shells
Artillery is the dominant killer in the Ukraine war, and ammunition supply has been the single most important logistics constraint on both sides. North Korea's contribution here has been decisive for Russian endurance. South Korean military intelligence estimated in mid-2025 that North Korea may have supplied more than 12 million rounds of 152mm artillery shells, shipped in roughly 28,000 containers since deliveries began. Earlier, Ukraine's GUR estimated around 4 million shells delivered from the middle of 2023, more than three-quarters of them 122mm and 152mm Soviet-caliber rounds.
These numbers are derived from container tracking, satellite imagery and signals intelligence, not from audited inventories, so they are best read as orders of magnitude. What is not in doubt among Western analysts is that North Korean ammunition allowed Russia to maintain firing rates that its own production and depleted stockpiles could not have supported alone.
KN-23 and KN-24 Ballistic Missiles
Beyond shells, North Korea has supplied KN-23 and KN-24 short-range ballistic missiles — systems broadly comparable to Russia's own Iskander in role, carrying large warheads several hundred kilometers. Ukrainian intelligence reported roughly 148 KN-23/KN-24 missiles delivered by the start of 2025, with further batches expected through the year. At points in the war, Western and Ukrainian sources said North Korean missiles made up a significant share of Russian ballistic-missile launches.
Early use revealed accuracy and reliability problems, but reporting indicated that performance improved over time as feedback flowed back to North Korean designers — an unsettling secondary effect, since combat use against Ukraine effectively serves as a live test program for Pyongyang's missile force.
Troop Deployment to Kursk
The most striking escalation came in late 2024, when North Korea deployed an estimated 13,000 or more troops to Russia, concentrated in Kursk Oblast to help repel Ukraine's incursion into Russian territory. South Korean and Western sources reported additional reinforcements and rotations through 2025, with assessments of further thousands being prepared.
These soldiers reportedly suffered heavy casualties, especially in the early phase, as they adapted to drone-saturated modern combat very different from anything in North Korean doctrine. For Pyongyang the deployment offered hard currency, technology access and irreplaceable combat experience; for Moscow it freed Russian manpower at a politically sensitive moment. Casualty estimates vary widely and should be treated cautiously.
Quality Issues
North Korean materiel has a mixed reputation. Ukrainian and Western reporting describes high dud rates, inconsistent propellant and occasional safety incidents with older stock, alongside more usable newer production. Some North Korean shells reportedly damaged Russian gun barrels or failed to detonate. Early ballistic-missile deliveries showed poor accuracy.
Yet the strategic logic is volume over precision. Even with a meaningful failure rate, millions of shells let Russia keep up a punishing tempo of fire. In an attritional war, an imperfect shell that arrives is worth more than a perfect one that does not exist. This is the core reason the partnership matters despite quality complaints.
Why the Partnership Matters
The Russia–North Korea axis is a two-way exchange. North Korea gains hard currency, food, energy and — most consequentially — access to advanced Russian military technology and combat data. Russia gains one of the very few suppliers able to deliver Soviet-caliber ammunition at scale and at speed, plus expendable manpower.
Analysts generally frame the effect as significant for endurance and attrition rather than a single decisive factor. It removed a critical Russian vulnerability — the risk of running short of shells — and signalled the emergence of a sanctions-resistant bloc pooling military capability. The longer-term concern in Seoul and Washington is what Pyongyang receives in return, which could erode the qualitative edge of allied forces in Asia.
As with all figures on this page, the underlying data is intelligence-derived and imperfect. The direction of travel — large, sustained DPRK support — is well established; the precise magnitudes are not.
Key Data
| Category | Open-source estimate |
|---|---|
| 152mm shells (mid-2025, S. Korea) | >12 million rounds (~28,000 containers) |
| Total shells (GUR, from mid-2023) | ~4 million, mostly 122mm/152mm |
| Ballistic missiles (by early 2025) | ~148 KN-23/KN-24 |
| Troops deployed (from Oct 2024) | ~13,000+, focused on Kursk |
| Reported quality | mixed; high dud rates on older stock |
| Data confidence | intelligence estimates, uncertain |
⚠ Figures are approximate intelligence estimates (Kyiv Independent / S. Korean intel, Reuters). They are uncertain and shift over time. Not investment advice.
Frequently Asked Questions
How many artillery shells has North Korea sent to Russia?
South Korean military intelligence estimated in mid-2025 that North Korea may have supplied more than 12 million rounds of 152mm artillery shells via roughly 28,000 containers. Ukraine's GUR earlier estimated around 4 million shells from mid-2023, mostly 122mm and 152mm. These are intelligence estimates, not audited counts, and the totals have grown over time.
What missiles has North Korea supplied to Russia?
North Korea has supplied KN-23 and KN-24 short-range ballistic missiles. Ukrainian intelligence reported roughly 148 KN-23/KN-24 missiles delivered by the start of 2025, with further deliveries expected during the year. Western and Ukrainian sources have said North Korean missiles accounted for a significant share of Russian ballistic-missile launches at points in the war.
Did North Korea send troops to fight in Ukraine?
Yes. From around October 2024 North Korea deployed an estimated 13,000 or more troops to Russia, primarily to help retake Russian territory in Kursk Oblast occupied by Ukrainian forces. Additional rotations and reinforcements were reported through 2025. Casualty figures among these troops have been substantial according to South Korean and Western assessments.
Are North Korean shells good quality?
Quality is reported to be mixed. Ukrainian and Western sources have described high dud rates, inconsistent propellant and occasional safety problems with older North Korean stock, alongside more usable newer production. Even imperfect shells, however, helped Russia sustain very high artillery firing rates that Western stockpiles could not match.
What share of Russia's ammunition comes from North Korea?
Western and Ukrainian intelligence sources have suggested North Korean ammunition accounted for a large share — at points cited as roughly half or more — of the rounds Russia fired in Ukraine, and a meaningful share of ballistic-missile launches. These are estimates that vary by period and source and should be read as orders of magnitude, not precise percentages.
Why does North Korea help Russia?
Pyongyang gains hard currency, food and energy, and — most importantly — access to advanced Russian military technology, combat experience for its troops, and diplomatic backing. For Russia, North Korea is one of the few suppliers able to deliver Soviet-caliber ammunition at scale quickly, making it a critical wartime partner.
What are the KN-23 and KN-24 missiles?
The KN-23 and KN-24 are North Korean short-range ballistic missiles broadly comparable to Russia's Iskander and to older Western systems. They carry large warheads over several hundred kilometers and can be used against fixed targets and cities. Their accuracy has been described as variable, but they add to Russia's strike capacity and complicate Ukrainian air defense.
How are North Korean weapons delivered to Russia?
South Korean intelligence has tracked thousands of shipping containers moving by sea and rail from North Korea to Russian ports and then onward by rail toward the front. The roughly 28,000-container figure cited in 2025 is the basis for the multi-million-shell estimates. Container counts are an indirect proxy and carry uncertainty.
Has the partnership changed the course of the war?
It has helped Russia sustain its artillery-heavy way of fighting at moments when its own stockpiles and production were under strain, and freed manpower in Kursk. Analysts generally see it as significant for endurance and attrition rather than as a single decisive factor, but it removed a key Russian vulnerability — running short of shells.
Where can I verify these North Korea supply figures?
Useful sources include South Korea's National Intelligence Service and Ministry of National Defense briefings, Ukraine's GUR, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), and reporting by Reuters, the Kyiv Independent and others. All figures are intelligence estimates with inherent uncertainty; check the source and as-of date before relying on any single number.